Georgia Southern University

Digital Commons@Georgia Southern
Legacy ETDs
Summer 1998

Perception and United States Nuclear Nonproliferation
Policy
Katherine Ellen Fitch

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd_legacy
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Fitch, Katherine Ellen, "Perception and United States Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy"
(1998). Legacy ETDs. 747.
https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd_legacy/747

This thesis (open access) is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons@Georgia
Southern. It has been accepted for inclusion in Legacy ETDs by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu.

PERCEPTION
NUCLEAR

AND

UNITED

STATES

NONPROLJFERATION

Katherine

Ellen

Fitch

POLICY

■ r '~"*t
<t-

v

-« f-.

^.i
^
He
;J
j'N ^'*'.iT*. -SAM^Vfrri • Tr»jTiifT- ^
j-' '"" • "' '
"
" "•' «
?\ ?Azh S. HftRder?or! Library 0
'-ii

'>XS- iX-5
"•".y'
- dr*7*
*■- * ^ ^-..:,-i'% vr ^V>j'
s. 'ii-"*
. - - >5k ...v
4
(

Perception and United States
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
by
Katherine Ellen Fitch

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty
of the College of Graduate Studies
At Georgia Southern University
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
in the Department of Political Science

Statesboro, Georgia
July, 1998

Perception and United States
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
by
Katherine Ellen Fitch

, Chairperson

Zia Hash mi

Bam' Bal/eck

G.Lane van Tassel
Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs
and Dean of Graduate Studies

Date

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis committee for their comments and
suggestions, but most of all for their patience while I slowly completed this work. Their
contributions greatly improved the overall quality of this work and saved me from several
factual errors. In particular I would like to thank Dr. Balleck for his helpful suggestions
in my theory and methodology chapters. Dr. Hashmi for his comments on the nature of
nuclear weapons, and Dr. Van Tassell for consistently encouraging me to go forward
with my ideas.

in

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
LIST OF TABLES
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION
The Problem of Nuclear Proliferation
Theory and Practice in US Policy
Social Identity Theory
PART I. HISTORY AND POLICY
2. THE HISTORY OF US NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
POLICY
The Development of Policy: 1945-1989
Trends and Biases in US Policy
3. US NONPROLIFERATION POLICY IN THE
POST-COLD WAR PERIOD
Changes in the International System
Patterns of Proliferation
Nonproliferation Policy Under Presidents Bush and Clinton
US Policy and Non-Rogue States

iv

US Policy and the Rogue States
US Policy in Comparison
4. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY, PERCEPTION, AND
ATTRIBUTION BIAS

45

Social Identity Theory
Misperception and Attribution Bias
US Identity and Perception
5. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

58

Content Analysis
Research Design
PART IE THE CASE STUDIES
6. IRAQ

72

7. IRAN

83

8. LIBYA

91

9. NORTH KOREA

98

10. PAKISTAN

108

11. CONCLUSION

118

Effects of US policy on Nonproliferation
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

125

Appendix
1. Member States of the LSC

136

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1. Coding Example for Content Analysis

70

2. Coding Example for Dispositional Co-occurrences

70

3. Iraq: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences

75

4. Iraq: Dispositional and Situational References

76

5. Iraq: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type

78

6. Iran: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences

86

7. Iran: Dispositional References

86

8. Iran: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type
9. Libya: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences

84
93

10. Libya: Dispositional References

94

11. Libya: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type

95

12. North Korea: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences

102

13. North Korea: Dispositional and Situational References

103

14. North Korea: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type

104

15. Pakistan: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences

112

16. Pakistan: Situational and Dispositional References

113

17. Pakistan: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type

114

18. Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences for All States

119

vi

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Problem of Nuclear Proliferation

Nuclear weapons are classed as weapons of mass destruction because of their ability to
indiscriminately inflict massive damage.1

Despite continued attempts by the US and

other countries to integrate them into conventional force structures, for the most part, they
have been defined by scholars, politicians and militaries as unconventional and unusable."
Their only value lies in not using them. In 1996 the International Court of Justice even
declared that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons" was generally unlawful except in
extreme instances of self-defense.3 No nation has employed nuclear weapons during a
conflict since World War II despite numerous conflicts with nonnuclear states.4 A type of

'Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) include chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons.
2

Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th
ed., rev. Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 33. This statement
does not reflect the view of all states, leaders or militaries as reflected in the continued
drive by some states to develop nuclear weapons. See also Herman Kahn, Thinking
About the Unthinkable in the 1980s (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 38.
3

Mike Moore, "World Court Says Mostly No to Nuclear Weapons," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 52, no.5 (September 1996): 39.
4

T.V. Paul, "Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts," Journal of
Conflict Resolution 39 (December 1995): 697.
1

2
taboo against their use has developed because they violate both ethical considerations and
the principle of proportional retaliation.5 This principle states that a state must respond to
aggression with a level of force in proportion to the original act of aggression.
Despite the fact that they have not been used in over fifty years, the spread of nuclear
weapons is considered a problem by the majority of states because of the fear that
proliferation increases the likelihood of nuclear warfare. Nuclear proliferation can be
defined as the creation or possession of a nuclear device by any state. By this definition,
the creation of one nuclear device by any state, including those already possessing them,
constitutes proliferation. This definition acknowledges both the vertical and horizontal
dimensions of proliferation. Horizontal proliferation refers to the acquisition of nuclear
technology by states not currently possessing it. Vertical proliferation refers to increases
in existing arsenals. Both types of proliferation are thought to increase the chance of
nuclear use.
States which have newly acquired nuclear weapons may not have the secunty arrange¬
ments necessary to safeguard against unintentional use, theft, or accidents.6 These states
may also be engaged in enduring conflicts which increase the likelihood that nuclear
weapons may be used.

Studies of deterrence suggest that it may not be applicable in all

5

Ibid., 698; and, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The
Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," in The Culture of National Secunty: Norms
and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996), 114-152.
6

Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 75-85.
7

Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing
Three Competing Models," American Political Science Review 87 (March 1993): 61-73.

3
situations, especially if a state is unable to create a secure second strike capability.8
Finally, norms of nonuse which have developed among the acknowledged nuclear states
may not be as salient to the identities of new nuclear nations.9 Vertical proliferation also
increases the chance that nuclear weapons will be used. The more time and resources a
state has devoted to the development of a large nuclear arsenal, the more it may be forced
to depend upon it and justify its development. A nuclear war between two large arsenals
would probably not remain limited to one or two weapons but employ hundreds.
There is an alternative theory of the role of nuclear weapons in international politics
which sees nuclear weapons as a stabilizing force.10 The crux of this argument is that
nuclear weapons have been the cause of the "long peace" among Western nations since
World War II and that if every nation possessed them states would find the costs of
waging war too high. The result would be global peace. Even if this theory was found to
be accurate, it highlights the other problem associated with the spread of nuclear weap¬
ons. Proliferation limits the ability of states to act in the international system. For
instance, if all states possessed nuclear weapons they may not engage in warfare, but they
would also be prevented from engaging in many other activities such as humanitarian
interventions and acting to stop ethnic cleansing, human rights abuses and environmental
degradation. A world free from international warfare would not mean a world free from
violence and conflict.

8

Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 66-68.

9

Price and Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence," 125.

10

Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1-45.

4
The US has generally opposed the spread of nuclear weapons for both of these
reasons. The most feared consequence of nuclear proliferation has been the possibility
that nuclear weapons would be used by an enemy, terrorists or an irresponsible leader
against the US or its allies. Yet the US also realizes that proliferation would severely
limit its ability to pursue its goals and interests internationally."
The US has also opposed the spread of nuclear weapons because it fears a prolifera¬
tion domino effect. A strong argument exists that the USSR developed nuclear weapons
in response to the US, which in turn motivated China, India, and Pakistan to develop
nuclear weapons.12 There are several reasons why states seek to develop nuclear weapons
such as prestige, technological momentum, and domestic factors.13 Yet, security
concerns are the predominate reason why a state begins to develop nuclear weapons.'4
All states originally began their programs in response to perceived threats. When an
enemy develops nuclear weapons, it increases the insecurity of other states and may push
them to develop nuclear weapons.
Although the US's main goal in promoting nonproliferation was self-interest, there
also existed the concern that these weapons presented a danger to humanity. The moral
and ethical dilemmas of possessing weapons of mass destruction influenced its decision

"Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies 4 (Spring 1995): 465.
l2

Ronald J. Bee, Nuclear Proliferation: The Post-Cold-War Challenge, Headline
Series, no.303 (Ithaca, NY: Foreign Policy Association, 1995), 14.
"Gary T. Gardner, Nuclear Nonproliferation: A Primer (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner,
1994), 80.
l4

Thayer, The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation, 482.

5
to advocate nonproliferation. This concern can be seen in such proposals as the Baruch
Plan which proposed placing all nuclear materials under international controls.15

Theory and Practice in US Policy

In theory, the US considers all proliferation a threat to its national interests and
opposes the spread of nuclear weapons to any state. Though mainly concerned with hori¬
zontal proliferation, it also advocates, in theory, the reduction of current nuclear arsenals,
including its own, in the interest of promoting nonproliferation and reducing the threat of
nuclear war. Yet the history of US nonproliferation policy clearly reveals a gap between
theory and practice. The US has not consistently opposed proliferation among nuclear or
nonnuclear states. The nuclear programs of some states have been ignored while others
have incurred harsh military and economic sanctions. Technology has been denied to
nonnuclear states while the nuclear powers continued to build their arsenals. These
discrepancies have been a noted feature of US nonproliferation policy for the last fifty
years and have led to the characterization of its policy as "ambivalent, equivocal, and
selective."16

15Peter A. Clausen, Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to
the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: HarperCollins CollegePublishers, 1993), 17.
Some scholars argue that the US never intended the Baruch Plan senously and only
proposed it to ensure that the Soviet Union rejected it. See Gregg Herken, The Winning
Weapon (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), 181-182.
'6Clausen, Nonproliferation, xii.

6
Due to the prominent role the US plays in global nonprohferation, some scholars find
this discrimination counterproductive and believe it undermines support for nonprohfera¬
tion within the international community.17 A state which has chosen to forego nuclear
weapons may rethink its position if it believes that other states are being provided with
the opportunity to build nuclear weapons. Several states, most notably India, have
pointed to discriminatory standards as a basis for opposition to US led nonprohferation
initiatives such as the Treaty on the Nonprohferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). They believe that the only way to create an
international climate in which nuclear weapons are perceived as illegitimate and unpro¬
ductive is to hold all states to the same standards and uniformly apply nonprohferation
policies.
US policymakers, however, often consider discrimination a natural consequence of
foreign policy making. While they may agree that discrimination sometimes does not
promote nonprohferation, they feel that all policy must be subject to a "political rational¬
ity" in which trade-offs and compromises are necessary to balance the competing
interests of the state whether they be economic, strategic, or political.18 They believe US
policy should discriminate because it serves the self-interest of the state. While both
sides of this debate make valid points, the purpose of this study is not to resolve whether

17

Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky and George Bunn, "The Doctrine of the Nuclear-Weapon
States and the Future of Non-Proliferation," Arms Control Today 24, no.6 (July 1994): 39; and, Deepa Ollapally and Raja Ramanna, "U.S.-India Tensions: Misperceptions on
Nuclear Proliferation," Foreign Affairs 74, no.l (January/February 1995): 14.
18

Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 21.

7
or not US policy should discriminate, but instead aims to explore why the US chooses to
discriminate against some states and not others.
Although bias has been present in US nonproliferation policy since the creation of the
bomb, this thesis will focus upon policy since the end of the Cold War for two reasons.
First, nonproliferation has become a high priority on the foreign policy agenda, especially
in the Clinton administration. The issue not only receives more attention, but more
resources, monetary and military, are devoted to it. Second, the biases in US policy have
become more evident. Since the early 1990s the US has focused its nonproliferation
efforts upon a group of states which it has termed "rogue" or "outlaw" states. No
concrete definition exists for what a rogue state is nor is the list of states in this category
static; however, all are defined by their ambitions to create or develop nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons.19 The states most often identified as rogues are Iran, Iraq, Libya,
and North Korea.20 These states have been subject not only to US sanctions and export
controls, but potentially to military action to prevent and slow their nuclear programs. In
contrast, other states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel have been subject to far fewer
reprisals and recriminations than the advanced nature of their programs should warrant.
All three are acknowledged to already possess nuclear weapons and India and Pakistan
have openly tested.

l9

Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New
Foreign Policy (New York: Hill & Wang, 1995), 23.
20

Occasionally Syria, Algeria, and Cuba are included in this category. Cuba is the
only state not commonly considered to be pursuing nuclear weapons.

8
Social Identity Theory

Why has the US chosen to focus its nonproliferation efforts upon the so-called rogue
states and exert much less pressure against de facto nuclear states? Realist explanations
which focus upon the material capability of states do not explain US policy because from
a material stand point India, Pakistan, and Israel are better equipped to threaten the US
with nuclear weapons. Other explanations which focus upon the national interest also fail
to explain US policy because they do not explain exactly what the national interest is.
Without a basis for determining what the national interest is, this type of explanation
becomes tautological and can be used to explain almost any US policy.
This thesis intends to apply social identity theory as an explanation for why the US
applies discriminatory standards of nonproliferation among states. This theory suggests
that how the US defines its interests and perceives threat is influenced by its group
memberships and identity.21 In short, states form groups based on shared identities and
the need to protect and enhance this group identity leads to collectively held perceptual
biases. This study will focus upon one type of misperception, attribution bias. Attribu¬
tion bias says that a state will attribute the bad behavior of an enemy to the internal
character of the enemy and not to external or situational factors such as security

21

See Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychol¬
ogy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

concerns.22 These cognitive biases can lead to overestimations of threat which may lead
to discriminatory standards and excessive policy options such as military strikes.
Social identity theory downplays the influence of the international system on US
foreign policy and focuses upon the domestic determinants of policy. This "second
image" approach argues that the internal structure and characteristics of the state, such as
identity, determine state behavior.23 This theory provides a better explanation for US
policy in several ways. It explains the imbalance between threat perception and capabil¬
ity in US policy. It also accounts for the US's exaggerated perception of the rogue states
as the greatest current threat to international peace and security by clarifying how the US
defines its national interest.
A better understanding of the cognitive biases affecting policymakers is important
because perception influences judgment and judgment is integral to policy making.
Misperceptions on the part of policymakers can lead to the adoption of harsh nonproliferation policies which may actually encourage proliferation and discourage policy options
which deal with the underlying reasons for proliferation. The intense focus upon the
rogue states may encourage them to continue their nuclear programs by giving them
recognition and attention. Thus, if policy is to be improved, both academics and policy¬
makers can benefit from "a better understanding of how their own beliefs and tacit
assumptions about the international system, international politics, and other actors in the

22

Robert Jervis, Perception andMisperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 35-48.
23

Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959), 125.

10
state system influence their perception of developments, their diagnoses of situations, and
their judgments."24
Many factors influence US nonproliferation policy and the decisions of policymakers
to apply discriminatory standards. The cognitive biases generated by the social identity
of a state represent only some of these factors. Throughout this study other factors which
influence the process such as domestic, economic, and international issues will be dis¬
cussed to help explain US policy; however, many of these factors are influenced by
cognitive biases because these biases influence how the national interest is defined.
The application of psychological theory to nonproliferation policy is relatively unex¬
plored and therefore this thesis will only begin an inquiry into the subject by establishing
the existence of attribution bias. While most scholars acknowledge the existence of
biases within US policy, there has been little work on why they exist beyond references
to the national interest. Social identity theory has been used to explain the psychology
behind the formation of the nonproliferation regime.25 This thesis adopts the same
premise that shared identities affect how decisionmakers perceive threat, but focuses
more narrowly upon biases in US nonproliferation policy. This study will not detail the
nuclear programs of the states included in the study beyond what is necessary to establish
a background for the reader. Many books have been written on the subject with much

24

George, Bridging the Gap, 14.

25

Glenn Chafetz, "The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,"
The Journal of Politics 57 (August 1995): 743-775.

11
greater detail than could be accomplished here.26 What it will do is provide support for
an alternative explanation for the biases in US nonproliferation policy and link it to the
policy choices of decisionmakers.

26

See Leonard S. Spector, and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of
Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Michael J. Mazarr,
North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1996); Alan Friedman, Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House
Illegally Armed Iraq (New York: Bantam Books, 1993); and, Mitchell Reiss, Bridled
Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington DC:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995).

CHAPTER 2
THE HISTORY OF US NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

The application of discriminatory standards has been a feature of US nonproliferation
policy since 1945. Although its policy has evolved from strict technology denial and
bilateral arrangements to support for the international nonproliferation regime and
universal standards, it has continued to apply its policies selectively in order to advance
other goals. Discriminatory standards were usually justified by the Cold War and the
need to defend US interests. Yet the history of US policy reveals patterns of bias which
have continued into the policies of the 1990s despite the end of the Cold War with the
USSR.

The Development of Policy: 1945-1989

The US's first attempts to prevent proliferation centered around technology denial
and control. The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) was passed in 1946 which restricted all data
and technology related to the production or use of fissile materials for both peaceful and
military purposes.1 The exception to this act was Great Britain which did receive

'Bee, Nuclear Proliferation, 15.
12

13
technological aid from the US in the early stages of its program.2 The AEA reflected the
widespread belief within the scientific and military communities that control over
uranium sources, then thought to be very limited, and denial of technology were the keys
to preventing proliferation.3 In 1949 this belief was shattered when the USSR tested its
first nuclear device five years earlier than expected.
During the 1950s, strict technology denial gave way to nuclear cooperation and tech¬
nology control. President Eisenhower initiated the Atoms for Peace Program which
pledged the US to share its nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This sharing was
to be facilitated through the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
which would promote and monitor the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The Atoms
for Peace program was the genesis for what was later to be called the "nuclear bargain."4
The US would share its technology with other countnes in return for commitments not to
build nuclear weapons. These bilateral agreements allowed the US to both maintain its
dominance over nuclear technology and increase its influence overseas with the many
states eager to explore this new energy source. It was also during this penod that the
AEA was rewritten to allow industry participation in the nuclear field. This was seen as
economically beneficial and by the end of the 1960s the US was supplying 90 percent of
the world reactor market.5

2Clausen, Nonproliferation, 16-22.
3

Ibid., 7.

4

Ibid., 28.

5

Ibid., 41.

14
Yet the US was slowly beginning to realize the potential for nuclear proliferation
inherent in the nuclear bargain. India provided the first example of a weapons program
developed from peaceful technology provided by the US.b In 1963, India purchased two
power reactors from the US. They were the first to be exported to the developing world.
It was from these two reactors in Tarapur that India produced the plutonium for its
weapons program and the nuclear devices which were tested in 1974 and 1998. In
addition, China's first nuclear test in 1964 raised concern in Washington that nuclear
weapons had moved beyond the industrialized world. That same year the US began
pursuing a comprehensive international ban on the spread of nuclear weapons which
culminated in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The NPT which entered into force on 5 March 1970 is the most comprehensive
international nonproliferation arrangement with over 170 signatories.

Under Articles I

and II, parties to the treaty agree not to aid any nonnuclear state in acquiring nuclear
weapons and nonnuclear states pledge not to receive nuclear devices or attempt to acquire
them. Under Article III, all nuclear activities in nonnuclear states are subject to IAEA
inspections. The IAEA's role was expanded from facilitating nuclear sharing to include
verifying that countries receiving nuclear technology for peaceful purposes were not
diverting it to produce weapons. These inspections act as a confidence building measure
and also provide the basis upon which sanctions may be imposed for violations. In

6

Ibid., 102-103.

7

For text of the NPT and related documents see The United Nations and Nuclear Nonproliferation, The United Nations Blue Book Series, vol.3 (New York: Dept. Of Public
Information United Nations, 1995).

15
return, the nuclear states, which are defined as the US, Russia (formerly the USSR),
Great Britain, France, and China, pledge to share nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes and to work toward universal nuclear disarmament (Articles IV and VI.)
Although many nonnuclear states participated in the debates over the treaty, the final
document reflected the concerns and preferences of the nuclear powers and the US in
particular. The US gave few concessions to the nonnuclear states in return for their
pledges to forego nuclear weapons. The treaty does not specify a time period for
disarmament to occur and Article IV does not create a legal obligation for nuclear states
to cooperate with nonnuclear states. The US also refused to extend security guarantees to
the signatories which would have pledged US support had they been attacked with
nuclear weapons. Additionally, the nuclear weapons states did not have to submit to
IAEA inspections. Many states did, and still do, denounce the treaty as discriminatory.
The NPT and IAEA inspections form the backbone of the nuclear nonproliferation
regime.8 A regime is defined as "an authoritative arrangement among international actors
that facilitates the accomplishment of specific goals through a process involving coordi¬
nation of expectations and modification of certain behavior patterns."9 The

8

There is an extensive literature on regime theory and formation which debates the
existence and utility of international regimes. For further readings on the nonprolifera¬
tion regime and security regimes in general see Stephen D. Krasner, ed.. International
Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Joseph S. Nye, "Maintaining the
Non-Proliferation Regime," International Organisation 35 (Winter 1981): 15-38; Roger
K. Smith, "Explaining the Non-proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary
International Relations Theory," International Organization 41(Spring 1987): 253-281;
and, Michael Brzoska, "Is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation System a Regime? A Comment
on Trevor McMorris Tate," Journal of Peace Research 29 (1992): 215-220.
9

Trevor McMorris Tate, "Regime-building in the Non-Proliferation System," Journal
of Peace Research 27(1990): 402.

16
nonproliferation regime consists of the NPT, suppliers groups, and regional organizations
whose goal is to slow and/or prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by creating transpar¬
ency and confidence among states. The US helped create many of these treaties and
arrangements. The domestic legislation and restrictions enacted by individual states also
comprise part of the regime.
Although the regime has become an important barrier to proliferation, it suffers from
several weaknesses which compromise its effectiveness and call into question its utility.
First, the regime relies mainly upon technology denial and control which is becoming
less effective as nuclear technology diffuses. Second, IAEA inspections are conducted
with notice and only on declared facilities. Although the revelations of Iraq's program
have led to the adoption of more intrusive verification methods and special inspections,
issues of sovereignty still limit its inspection abilities. Third, the discriminatory aspects
of the regime have prejudiced support for it. The regime reflects the interest of the
nuclear states by maintaining their monopoly over nuclear weapons while providing few
assurances or benefits to the nonnuclear states.
Renewed concern over proliferation arose during the mid-1970s in response to two
emerging realities. First, the line between peaceful and military uses of nuclear technol¬
ogy was becoming more blurred as many states which had imported technology for
peaceful purposes now had or were developing active nuclear programs. These states
included India, Israel, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, Iraq, and South Africa. In
1974, India conducted what it referred to as a peaceful nuclear explosion. Second,
Europe began competing in the nuclear reactor market. The first of these developments

17
called into question the adequacy of US nonproliferation policies. The second raised
fears of further proliferation due to unregulated European competition for reactor sales.
In response the US initiated the creation of the Zangger Committee which was to keep
an up-to-date list of "trigger" materials and equipment that could be used to build
weapons.10 The goal of the committee was to raise awareness among the supplier states
of the potentials for technology misuse. The London Suppliers Group, later renamed the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), was also created at this time to regulate technology
transfers." It urged the nuclear states to restrict the export of dual-use technologies and
to insist on full-scope IAEA safeguards by any country importing nuclear technology.12
Dual-use technologies are those which have both civilian and military applications such
as supercomputers.
Domestically the US chose to strengthen its export criteria. In June 1976, the
Symington Amendment was passed which barred economic aid to states importing fuel
ennchment technology not under full-scope IAEA safeguards.13 In 1978, the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) became law and mandated stricter export criteria,
terminated US cooperation with countries pursuing a weapons program or failing to
submit to inspections, and set new standards for granting consent for reprocessing nuclear

10

Tate, "Regime-building," 406.

"Ibid.
'2Bee, Nuclear Proliferation, 27.
"Gerald C. Smith and Helena Cobban, "A Blind Eye to Nuclear Proliferation,"
Foreign Affairs 68, no.3 (Summer 1989): 58.

18
fuel of American origin.14 Additionally, both Presidents Ford and Carter worked to
remove the US's domestic nuclear program from dependence on plutomum which is
considered more of a proliferation hazard than uranium.15
During the 1960s and 1970s, the US also began a dialogue with the USSR on arms
control. In 1963, they initiated restrictions on their own nuclear programs by concluding
the Limited Test Ban Treaty.16 Later efforts included the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty
(1972), the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (1972), and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty
(1974).'

Although these treaties did not prevent nuclear build-ups by both states, they

did lay a foundation for later treaties such as the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty (INF)
and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which began to limit vertical proliferation
and fulfill the disarmament pledge under the NPT.
The Reagan and Bush administrations did not actively pursue nonproliferation.
Export controls and policies remained in effect and were enhanced by the passage of the
Solarz Amendment which banned aid to countries violating US export laws to acquire
nuclear weapons.18 Yet both administrations promoted nuclear exports and stressed the
need for cooperation on nuclear issues. The strategic needs of the Cold War outweighed
nonproliferation concerns and nuclear cooperation with states considered to be low

14

Gerald M. Steinberg, "US Non-Proliferation Policy: Global Regimes and Regional
Realities," Contemporary Security Policy 15, no.3(December 1994): 135.
15

Clausen, Nonproliferation, 135.

16

Bee, Nuclear Proliferation, 26.

17

Ibid.

18

Steinberg, "US Non-Proliferation Policy," 136.

19
proliferation risks was advocated.19 These states were either allies or client states. States
considered to be high proliferation risks were still routinely denied exports. These states
were usually either hostile toward or unneeded by the US. The country-by-country
approach taken under Presidents Reagan and Bush was a continuation of the tendency to
selectively apply nonproliferation policies to serve the national interest.20

Trends and Biases in US Policy

The history of US nuclear nonproliferation policy from 1945-1989 reveals several
trends which reflect the biases and inconsistencies within US policy. These trends reflect
the tension between maintaining a consistent nonproliferation policy and calculating the
costs to other interests.
The first trend is a continuing conflict between reliance on nuclear weapons and
efforts to deny them to other countries.21 Despite the US's attempts to downplay the
utility of nuclear weapons and promote the benefits of nuclear restraint, its own depen¬
dence on them countered this proposition. When the US decided to initiate a nuclear
build-up to counter the perceived Soviet threat, it enshrined the atomic bomb as the
ultimate weapon. Nuclear weapons became not only the ultimate security guarantor, but
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the key to international status and prestige. They were a symbol of a modem state.22 The
fact that all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are nuclear
powers is not lost on aspiring regional hegemons.
The second trend present in US nonproliferation policy has been the tension between
limiting the burden of overseas commitments while still addressing the security concerns
of potential nuclear powers.23 Throughout the Cold War period the US provided
extended deterrence to its allies to prevent them from seeking independent nuclear arse¬
nals. Extended deterrence played a major role in the decisions of Japan and Germany not
to acquire nuclear weapons even though they were technically capable.24 Likewise, US
security assurances contributed to the decisions of South Korea and Taiwan to abandon
their nuclear programs.25 In contrast, uncertainty over the US's commitment to Europe
prompted France to develop an independent nuclear arsenal during the 1950s.26
The third pattern in US nonproliferation policy has been its reluctance to exert
pressure against the nuclear programs and industries of close allies and client states.27
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Israel and Pakistan are two examples of this reluctance. Although the US attempted to
restrain its nuclear program in the early stages, by 1968 the US Central Intelligence
Agency was aware that Israel possessed nuclear weapons.28 Despite its refusal to join the
NPT or submit to IAEA inspections, the US maintained close ties with Israel throughout
the 1970s and 1980s and continued its economic and military aid in violation of US
domestic legislation.
In 1978, aid to Pakistan was withdrawn due to its nuclear program. However, in 1979
after the USSR invaded Afghanistan, aid was reinstated so that the US could continue to
send aid to a country in the forefront of containing Soviet aggression.29 Pakistan was not
bound by the Symington Amendment nor by the Solarz Amendment. In 1985, Congress
passed the Pressler Amendment which required the President to certify every year that
Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device as a condition on foreign aid. Presidents
Reagan and Bush continued this certification until 1990 despite knowledge of Pakistan's
nuclear program.30
Besides ignoring the nuclear programs of allies and clients, the US has also been
unwilling to apply sanctions for nonproliferation policy violations. In a study of sanc¬
tions from 1968-1991 the US never sanctioned a member the Liberal Security Commu¬
nity.31 Membership in the LSC is defined as "a group of established liberal democracies
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that self-consciously identify their security interests collectively on the basis of shared
core values and a history of cooperation."33 States not included in the LSC were rou¬
tinely sanctioned. For instance, South Africa was sanctioned several times between 1975
and 1991 for failing to adhere to nuclear safeguards and attempting to develop missiles.
France, Switzerland, and Israel, all of whom contributed to the South African program,
were not sanctioned.
This brief history of US nonproliferation policy from 1945 through the late 1980s has
shown that although the US accepted the idea of global nonproliferation standards, it
continued to apply its policies selectively. The prevailing explanations for these biases
were the Cold War and the need to defend the national interest. The strategic need to
contain the USSR justified subordinating nonproliferation goals and continuing the build¬
up of the US's nuclear arsenal. It was used to justify continued aid to allies and client
states such as Pakistan and Israel and to justify overlooking their violations of the inter¬
national nonproliferation regime. When the US did support nonproliferation efforts
among these states, it was not a priority and only occurred when it was not politically
costly.
Although the Cold War did influence the discriminatory standards in US policy, it is
inadequate in two ways. First, it is almost tautological to say that the US pursued its best
interests without saying exactly what those interests are. If interest is defined as counter¬
ing the USSR, then it would be expected that every act of discrimination was linked to a
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Cold War interest. Second, although the Cold War rivalry between the US and USSR is
over, the same patterns still persist in US policy.

CHAPTER 3
US NONPROLIFERATION POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

Changes in the International System

The fall of the Berlin Wall in December 1989 seemed to symbolize the end of the
Cold War although the process had been in motion for years. Throughout the early
1990s, as dramatic changes were taking place in superpower relations, many dramatic
occurrences were also taking place with regard to nuclear nonproliferation. Several states
renounced their nuclear ambitions, the Iraqi nuclear program was discovered, North
Korea threatened withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and the NPT
review conference was scheduled for 1995. It was also during this period that the US
found itself for the first time in fifty years without the Soviet Union as a guiding principle
behind its military build-up, strategic alliances, and foreign policy decisions. All of these
events served to renew attention to proliferation issues within the US.
In the fifty years since the bomb was developed, the international environment and
nonproliferation issues have changed dramatically. Five nations are declared nuclear
powers, three others, India, Pakistan and Israel, have nuclear capability, and many others
have attempted to develop these weapons. Despite the nonproliferation regime, suppliers
groups, and export controls, the spread of nuclear technology and the globalization of the
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arms industry has made nuclear weaponry more accessible than ever before.1 The main
lesson learned from the Iraqi program is that creating a nuclear device is now possible
through more technologies and more states than ever before.2 For a determined proliferator, current export controls can only slow the process, not prevent it.3
The spread and diversity of nuclear technologies has complicated the task of defining
proliferation and determining which states are proliferating. As already mentioned
nuclear proliferation can basically be defined as the creation or possession of a nuclear
device by any state. Beyond this basic definition, problems arise when trying to deter¬
mine what level of development constitutes proliferation. Does it mean having a fully
assembled nuclear device and the ability to launch it or has proliferation occurred when a
state possesses the technical capability to build a device? The types of technology that
could indicate a nuclear weapons program have expanded enormously and most have
dual-use capability. Further, missile technology is increasingly defined as a form of
proliferation; however, many states have interests in this technology for satellite pro¬
grams, not weapon delivery systems. These gray areas in the definition of proliferation
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have complicated the task of determining which states are proliferation risks and created
a situation in which proliferation is often determined by perception. In other words, a
state depends as much upon its perception of another state's intentions to determine if it is
a proliferation risk as upon the actual material capability of the state.

Patterns of Proliferation

When the Cold War ended, many scholars began predicting how systemic changes in
the international system would affect proliferation. One view was that proliferation
would become more likely because a multipolar world created more uncertainty which
would lead states to look to their own secunty.4 Others argued that proliferation would
be less likely because of reduced security threats and reductions in the arsenals of the
nuclear states.5 The growing historical trends toward free market economies and demo¬
cratization were also seen to promote nonproliferation.6 Many states pursuing economic
liberalization would embrace nonproliferation standards in order to gain access to inter¬
national capital.7 While this seems to have occurred in Brazil and Argentina, India and
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Pakistan have moved toward more open nuclear stances with their nuclear tests in 1998
and have endangered their access to foreign aid and World Bank loans. Another theory
suggests that proliferation would decrease among the core states (liberal/democratic
states) because they do not perceive each other as military threats and increase among the
peripheral states because of continued security concerns and ambitions.8
Looking at the pattern of proliferation since 1990, an asymmetrical pattern has
emerged with many states moving toward a nonnuclear position while others have con¬
tinued or accelerated their nuclear programs. South Africa voluntarily dismantled its
nuclear weapons program, joined the NPT and submitted to IAEA inspections in 1991.'
As liberal reforms have taken place, Brazil and Argentina both apparently have aban¬
doned their nuclear programs, placed all their nuclear facilities under bilateral and IAEA
inspections, and are working on confidence building measures.10 The nuclear states
which were created when the USSR disintegrated, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, all
chose to return their nuclear weapons to Russia and join the NPT as nonnuclear weapons
states." In addition, France and China both signed the NPT in 1992.
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On the other hand, many states maintained nuclear ambitions. Several states such as
Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria and North Korea continued to affirm their intentions to develop
nuclear weapons. Iraq's program, discovered after the Persian Gulf War, was found to be
far more advanced than previously suspected. The seriousness of North Korea's program
sparked a crisis in 1993 when it threatened to withdraw from the NPT over IAEA inspec¬
tions.12 Another set of states, India, Pakistan and Israel have continued to remain outside
the NPT and to advance their programs. In light of the nuclear tests conducted in 1998
by India and Pakistan, these states may be moving towards an arms race in South Asia.

Nonproliferation Policy Under Presidents Bush and Clinton

In some ways the Bush and Clinton administrations did not deviate from the nonpro¬
liferation policies of previous administrations. Both worked to promote nonproliferation
among all states by strengthening existing nonproliferation agreements. The US was
instrumental in securing the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and supported
efforts to expand the inspection authority of the IAEA after evidence of Iraq's evasion
was discovered. In 1994, the US proposed the Fissile Material Cut-Off which would
prohibit the further production of fissile material, uranium and plutonium.13 Several
initiatives to strengthen export controls have been proposed such as the Wassenaar
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Arrangement and the New Forum which would be a successor to the Coordinating
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM.)14 These new arrangements would
redirect export controls from an East-West focus to a global one. The US also supported
the decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to expand its export controls to cover dualuse items which effectively precluded nuclear commerce with India, Israel, and
Pakistan.15
Progress was made on arms control agreements with the signing of START I in July
1991 and START II in January of 1993 which reduced the US's nuclear arsenal and
helped to legitimize its nonproliferation goals. It has also worked on the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which would prohibit all nuclear testing. In line with support¬
ing the CTBT, in 1994 the US Congress passes the Glenn Amendment which would
impose sanctions against any state conducting a nuclear test. These sanctions could
include the termination of economic and military aid as well as financial assistance from
international sources such as the World Bank.
In many ways, the end of the Cold War reduced the US's reasons for tolerating
proliferation. No longer did the nuclear programs of clients need to be ignored in order
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to maintain their friendship. The resources which had been devoted to the Cold War
were now available for other goals such as nonproliferation. Nonprohferation became
one of the US's main foreign policy goals and the Clinton administration called it the
greatest danger to US and international security in the post-Cold War period. The com¬
mitment to preventing proliferation was more than rhetorical as indicated by the in¬
creased resources devoted to it and the creation of the Nonproliferation Center which is
designed to coordinate the government's intelligence efforts on proliferation issues.16
Yet instead of shifting to more universal standards, US policy seemed to become even
more polarized. With the nuclear renunciations of several midlevel proliferators such as
Brazil and Argentina, the disparity between the policies enacted against the remaining
states was much more obvious. Among most states, including the advanced programs of
states such as India and Israel, US policy continued to use the international regime, diplo¬
macy and incentives, and sanctions, when necessary to try and move these states toward a
nonnuclear stance. Among the rogue states such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya,
US policy moved toward enacting broad, indefinite sanctions and threatening military
action to halt their nuclear programs.

US Policy and Non-Rogue States

Among states not defined as rogues, nonproliferation strategy in the 1990s has been
one of diplomatic and political pressure, economic incentives, and sanctions when
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necessary. There was more emphasis on economic assistance as a tool than ever before
and less emphasis on technology denial. The US recognized the security and other con¬
cerns behind the nuclear programs of these states and tried to develop strategies to meet
them.
One indication of these changes was a new willingness to consider regional arms
control arrangements. In a reversal of previous policy, the US lent its support to the
creation of several nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ) in Africa and the South Pacific
and has shown interest in a Middle East NWFZ proposed by Egypt.1

Previous adminis¬

trations felt regional arrangements undermined the authority of the NPT and international
regime. Although support for universal arrangements such as the NPT continue to be the
preferred policy, the acceptance of regional arrangements indicates its recognition of the
need to be flexible with specific regional tensions and issues.
In South Asia, the US began to move from preventing proliferation to encouraging
regional nuclear nonproliferation initiatives as mandated by the 1992 amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act.18 This initiative requires the President to submit reports twice
yearly on the ballistic and nuclear capabilities of India, Pakistan, and China, but does not
impose sanctions of any kind. Instead of rolling-back the nuclear programs of India and
Pakistan, the US encouraged confidence building measures and acceptance of IAEA
inspections on all nuclear facilities.19 The US also proposed five-way talks between
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itself, India, Pakistan, China and the Russia as a way to deal with the tensions contrib¬
uting to proliferation in the region.20 Even after the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan
and the imposition of sanctions, the US continued to stress the need to deal with the
underlying tensions driving the nuclear programs of these states.
Israel has received little pressure from the US to abandon its nuclear program, but
was persuaded by the US in 1991 to abide by the export controls of the Missile Technol¬
ogy Control Regime (MTCR).2' Israel's participation in the MTCR, however, only limits
its aid to other countries and does not affect its own missile program.
A new aspect of nonproliferation policy was the use of "dollar diplomacy" to induce
states to renounce their nuclear weapons.22 Some policymakers felt that economic incen¬
tives would only encourage more proliferation, but others saw it as a necessary conces¬
sion to meet the concerns of these states. In 1991 Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear
Threat Reduction Act (Nunn-Lugar) which pledged $400 million to assist in safely dis¬
mantling nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union (FSU).23 Related to this was the
creation of the International Science and Technology Center which provides employment
to scientists in the FSU so that their knowledge and expertise would not be sold on the
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international market.*4 In addition to the original S400 million pledged, the US pledged
to Belarus an additional $65 million after it ratified START I and the NPT.25 Extensive
negotiations yielded the "Trilateral Statement" between the US, Russia, and Ukraine.
Ukraine agreed to yield all nuclear weapons on its soil to Russia and in return it received
political, economic, and security benefits."6 Security guarantees by the US were indis¬
pensable to gaining this agreement. The US also promised an additional $200 million in
assistance to Ukraine in exchange for signing this agreement.2
The biggest economic incentive given to a state in exchange for pledges to cap its
nuclear program was to North Korea. Under the Agreed Framework, a multilateral
consortium—the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO)—was to be devel¬
oped in order to supply North Korea with two light-water reactors.28 This type of reactor
produces very little plutonium and thus is considered proliferation-resistant. The esti¬
mated cost on these reactors is $4 billion. The US contribution would be $20 to $30
million a year until the reactors were operating.29
Export controls, long considered to be one of the key aspects of preventing prolifera¬
tion, continued to be laxly enforced among select states.30 In 1993 and 1994 steps were
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taken to ease export restrictions for many dual-use items such as supercomputers and
micro-electronics.31 The easing of export controls for most states was an indication of the
US's new willingness to utilize diplomacy than more restrictions and sanctions.
When sanctions were applied to non-rogue states, they were applied in response to a
specific violation and were removed once the violation was rectified. For example,
sanctions were imposed on Russia in May 1992 for sales to India in violation of the
MTCR.32 Once the sales were halted, the sanctions were lifted with no further repercus¬
sions. In October 1990, all economic and military assistance to Pakistan was terminated
when President Bush was unable to certify to Congress that it did not possess a nuclear
device under the Pressler Amendment.33 Yet tensions over these sanctions did not pre¬
clude US trade with Pakistan nor did they prevent the US from pursuing other avenues of
pressure. Likewise, the sanctions imposed upon India and Pakistan for their 1998 nuclear
tests can be removed when they sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and possibly
the Nonproliferation Treaty.

US Policy and the Rogue States

During the Clinton administration, the rogue image became more concrete and inte¬
grated into official rhetoric. US policy toward the rogue states took two forms: increased
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sanctions and potential military action. There was decreased emphasis on diplomacy and
negotiation with these states.
The US's focus upon these states began in the late 1980s as the Soviet threat dimin¬
ished. The Pentagon found itself without a guiding principle or rationale for its defense
budget. The search for a new enemy led military planners to construct what is nowknown as the "Rogue Doctrine."34 This doctrine, which began to form in the Bush
administration, substituted the threat of Third World proliferation for the Soviet threat.
While this doctrine at first focused upon the military capabilities of states, this presented
two problems for military planners. First, even the best armed Third World nation did
not present enough of a threat to justify the budget enjoyed during the Cold War/5 This
eventually led to the conclusion that the military needed to be able to fight two wars
simultaneously. It also led military planners to focus upon the most potentially threaten¬
ing aspect of these states, their quest for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Second,
by focusing upon potential military and WMD threats from the Third World, many states
which were current allies of the US had to be included on the list of potential rogues.
This led military planners to focus upon the political character of these states with
emphasis upon those least friendly with the US.36
By 1990 a rogue state could be classified as "a hostile (or seemingly hostile) Third
World state with large military forces and nascent WMD capabilities...bent on sabotaging
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the prevailing world order. Such regimes were said to harbor aggressive intentions vis-avis their less powerful neighbors, to oppose the 'spread of democracy,' and to be guilty of
circumventing international norms against nuclear and chemical proliferation."3. The
rogue image drew heavily from the literature on international terrorism which helped to
link these two images and reinforce the danger of these states.38 When Iraq invaded
Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the Rogue Doctrine was given a face for its enemy. Iraq came
to symbolize the evil and aggressive nature of states which violated international norms
and developed weapons of mass destruction.39
The creation of the rogue image was the result of several converging factors: renewed
interest in nonproliferation, domestic politics, and the actions of the rogue states them¬
selves. As already discussed, several international events dramatized proliferation con¬
cerns within the US. Domestically, the Defense Department, national laboratones, and
ethnic lobbies such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) all favored
targeting these states as potential military threats because it furthered their own inter¬
ests.40 The Defense Department could continue to justify its defense budget.41 Several
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national laboratories which were feeling cut-backs in the post-Cold War penod now had
a new goal—to help develop technology for detecting, monitoring, and fighting prolifera¬
tion.42 Although business and industry generally opposed the targeting and subsequent
sanctions placed on the rogue states, other interest groups such as AIPAC were very
influential in wanting to maintain the image of states such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria as
military threats.43 In this way, military and foreign aid to Israel would remain a priority.
Yet it was also the actions of these states which classified them as rogues. All of these
states have engaged in behavior and rhetoric considered unacceptable by the majority of
the international community, including human rights abuses, support for terrorism,
repression, and the use of chemical weapons. All have violated, or are suspected of
violating, the international norm against acquiring nuclear weapons and their obligations
under the NPT to which they are signatones. In addition, all have at some point espoused
anti-Western or anti-American sentiments, opposed US interests, and/or been engaged in
conflicts with the US. All of these factors made them likely candidates for classification
as rogues.
The rogue states are routinely denied nuclear exports and placed under broad sanc¬
tions. Iran and Iraq are under the most stringent export controls as mandated by the IranIraq Nonproliferation Act of 1992.44 In 1994, Congress expanded the term terrorism to
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include efforts by any nonnuclear state, group or individual to acquire or create nuclear
explosives.45 Therefore, many of the restrictions and sanctions which were created to
deal with terrorism were now applicable to the nuclear programs of the rogue states, all of
which are classified as state sponsors of terrorism.
Sanctions placed on these states are in response to a wide vanety of behaviors inclu¬
ding their WMD programs. Since sanctions are not just in response to nuclear violations
it is difficult to have sanctions removed because a list of grievances must be rectified, not
just the nuclear violation. In 1992, the UN Security Council, with the support of the US,
declared proliferation to be a threat to international peace and security which opened the
way for using multilateral sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.46
The US also strengthened sanctions against individuals, states and companies which
contribute to the nuclear programs of the rogue states. The Foreign Relations Authoriza¬
tion Act of 1994 imposes sanctions on individuals which contribute to proliferation
through export activities.4' The 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
prohibits assistance to terrorist states by US firms or individuals.48 The Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act applies this law to any person, foreign or US, trading or investing with
Libya or Iran.49
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The Persian Gulf War and the subsequent revelations of Iraq's nuclear program laid
the groundwork for more active military involvement in nonproliferation. The military
action against Iraq provided the prototype of a rogue state for defense planners. During
the war, sites which were known to be involved in nuclear and chemical weapons design
were targeted in an effort to destroy Iraq's capabilities.50 After the war, the US supported
all UN resolutions mandating the destruction of Iraq's WMD capabilities and has been
willing to threaten military action in order to force Hussein to allow inspectors access to
all suspected sites.
Iraq's program highlighted the need to be able to deal with a successful proliferator
and helped shift the focus of nonproliferation from preventing to fighting it.31 The
Pentagon is now challenging the traditional centers of nonproliferation activity, the State
Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), whose focus has
been on diplomacy, exports and sanctions.52 In 1993, the Clinton administration unveiled
its first major defense initiative, the Defense Counter Proliferation Initiative. The core of
this initiative was to apply military resources and planning to address the threats posed by
emerging WMD capabilities around the globe.53 The exact meaning of counterproliferation has not been ascertained and has changed over several years. The Pentagon has
argued that this initiative is to supplement, not replace diplomatic efforts to prevent
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proliferation; however, the potential for pre-emptive military strikes has alarmed many
within the US and abroad that the US may be willing to unilaterally use force to prevent
the development of WMD by certain states.54 This has led the Pentagon to focus on the
defensive aspects of the program while admitting that it is applicable to offensive strikes.
The US also considered military strikes an option for ending North Korea's nuclear
program. During the crisis over inspections, the US prepared plans for a possible cruise
missile attack on the Yongbyon nuclear complex.55 This option was never publicly
advocated.
Another issue which raised questions about the role of the military in nonproliferation
policy was the White House statement in 1996 that the US would retain its options to use
nuclear weapons if attacked by a state, party to a nuclear weapons free zone or the NPT,
that employed weapons of mass destruction.56 The US has maintained its right to use
nuclear weapons in self-defense against a nuclear attack. The 1996 statement, however,
expanded this option to include chemical and biological weapons. This opens the pos¬
sibility that the US would allow nuclear retaliation against a state such as Libya if it used
chemical weapons. Whether or not this scenario is likely, the statement symbolically
shows the US's willingness to use whatever means it deems necessary in the fight against
WMD.
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As can be seen from an overview of US policy toward the rogue states, it is difficult to
separate nonproliferation policy from other issues. Policy is affected by the actions of
these states, but it is also affected by their history of interaction, political differences, and
other behaviors by these states. Several issues of concern coincide with these states. For
instance, all have been defined as state supporters of terrorism and cited for human rights
abuses. They also all espouse radical ideologies with anti-Western or anti-American
elements.57 This runs counter to another high priority on the foreign policy agenda within
the Clinton administration, the doctrine of "democratic enlargement."58 One of the main
arguments for containing these states and preventing them from acquiring WMD is the
tear that they would threaten the democratic order.59 Separating policies designed to
counter the proliferation activities of these states from policies designed to alter their
government, end their support for terrorism and human rights abuses is almost impossible
because all of these elements are seen as part of their rogue character.
As an example of the nonspecific nature of US policy, both Iraq and Iran are currently
under the broad policy of "dual containment."<>l, This policy seeks to contain the activi¬
ties of both states at the same time without favoring one state to balance the other. In
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Iraq, it is hoped that this policy will bring about a regime change. In Iran it is meant to
contain several activities deemed unacceptable by the US. These include support for
international terrorism, opposition to the peace process, efforts to subvert other Arab
governments, a military build-up and efforts to acquire WMD. This broad policy makes
it almost impossible to separate the various issues of concern.

US Policy in Comparison

The US has focused its nonproliferation efforts upon the states it considers rogues.
The emphasis on sanctions and military planning to prevent proliferation among these
states has been considered overly harsh, punitive, and counterproductive by some. While
not denying that the actions of these states require action, current nonproliferation policy
can be judged as harsh by making three comparisons: to past policy, to the policies of
other Western nations, and to policies toward other states.
First, as the history of US policy showed, technology denial and diplomatic efforts
formed the basis of nonproliferation efforts for forty years. Not until the late 1980s did
the military become involved in nonproliferation. Threats of military action, the bomb¬
ing of Iraq's nuclear facilities during the Gulf War and military planning represent a new
aspect of policy.
Second, other Western nations do not concur with the US policy of sanctions or the
designation of certain states as rogues. They fear that the US has allowed favoritism to
color its choices and are concerned by the idea that it may unilaterally make itself judge.

42
jury and executioner over the nuclear programs of rogue states.61 Instead they see
engagement with these states as the best way to foster change in their policies. They
have refused to emulate the trade bans which the US has imposed upon Iran.62 Dissent is
also gathering over the continuation of sanctions on Iraq.63 While acknowledging these
states as potential threats, they view them more as opportunities and feel that US policy
magnifies the misbehavior of these states by over-emphasizing the threat and devoting
excessive resources to combating it.64
There is also a gap between US and IAEA assessments of threat from these states. In
1994 the IAEA stated that it had found no signs of unpeaceful nuclear activity in Iran.65
Yet the US maintained sanctions because of its belief that Iran has a hidden program.
Similarly, the IAEA has declared that it believes Iraq's ability to manufacture WMD has
been eliminated, but the US insists upon the continuation of sanctions.56
Third, in comparison to other states, the US applies harsher sanctions to the rogues
than other states. Although discriminatory standards have always been a part of US
policy, the differences in approaches have rarely been as stark. This chapter has outlined
the major differences in policy between the rogue states and others. While the rogue
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states are subject to sanctions and possibly military action, the US has preferred diplo¬
macy and incentives among other states.
The post-Cold War policies show a continued discrepancy of standards among states.
Despite the rhetoric proclaiming proliferation to be the greatest threat to international
peace and security, policy has remained ambivalent to the nuclear programs of several
states, while reacting strongly to those of the rogue states. Why has the US continued to
apply discriminatory standards? Policy is not based upon the material capabilities of the
states. India and Pakistan have both advanced to the point of conducting nuclear tests. In
light of the revelations of Mordecai Vanunu, an Israeli defector, Israel is believed to pos¬
sess between fifty and two hundred nuclear devices.67 All these states have refused to
join the NPT. In contrast, none of the rogue states has assembled, tested, or is yet able to
create a nuclear device. Iraq is under international monitoring. Iran is believed to be five
to eight years away from developing a nuclear device. Libya does not possess the infra¬
structure to build a nuclear weapon and attempts to purchase one have been rebuffed.
The extent of North Korea's program is uncertain and some believe it may have been able
to create one or two nuclear devices although this has not been confirmed.68 Nor is
policy based solely upon the breaking of international obligations. Each state which is
proliferating has broken international norms, including many Western nations which have
contributed to the nuclear programs of other states.
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The answer seems to lie in how the US perceives threat. Threat perception is tied to
how the US defines its interests and its relationships with other states. The US perceives
the actions of the rogue states as more threatening to its interests than the nuclear pro¬
grams of other states. This leads to overestimations of threat and the implementation of
harsh and often punitive policies. In the next section this theory will be developed to
explain how and why the US perceives the actions of the rogue states differently from
other nuclear proliferators and how this leads to overperceptions of threat.

CHAPTER 4
SOCIAL IDENTITY, PERCEPTION, AND ATTRIBUTION BI AS

Social identity theory offers an explanation for why the US applies discriminatory
standards of nonproliferation among states. This theory is rooted in social psychology
and suggests that the "constructed identities of states, governments, and other political
actors" influence how they define their security interests and perceive threats.1

In

contrast with realist and liberal theories that assume interests as given, this theory sees
interests as something which the state must learn through its interactions with other states
and actors in the international system.2 An examination of how identity shapes security
interests and affects the perceptions of policymakers provides a better explanation for the
bias within US nonproliferation policy than theories which focus upon material capabil¬
ity.
Social identity theory has been used to explain or clarify several types of state
behavior which have not been adequately explained by other theories such as the
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democratic peace3 and how nationalism influences conflict.4 One study has found that by
including identity protection as a goal of foreign policy, specific US foreign policy
stances could be better predicted.5 Changes in the identity and core values of a state are
also being used to predict changes in the general direction of foreign policy.6 In these
studies, social identity theory provided a basis for determining what the national interests
of a state were. This thesis builds upon a study which used social identity theory to
explain the formation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and why discriminatory
standards have been applied among its members.

The study proposes the existence of a

liberal security community (LSC) led by the US, and based upon a shared liberaldemocratic identity. Members of this in-group discriminate in favor of their own group
members even when it leads to less than optimal results.8 In support of this theory,
sanctioning practices within the nonproliferation regime were examined and a discrimina¬
tory pattern was found in favor of the LSC members.9 This thesis adopts the same
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premise that shared identities affect how decisionmakers perceive threat, but focuses
more narrowly upon biases in US nonproliferation policy.

Social Identity Theory

Identity can be defined as the basic character of a state and is composed of factors
which are intrinsic to the state and those which are relational.10 Intrinsic characteristics
include type of government, culture, history, and other factors specific to the state. Rela¬
tional characteristics are those which are relative to other actors in the international sys¬
tem. For instance, a state is only sovereign in relation to other states. Through social
interaction states also engender "values, norms, beliefs, role conceptions, attitudes,
stereotypes, and other cognitive and motivational phenomena."11 Thus both domestic and
international politics determine the identity of a state. This identity, however, is neither
unitary nor static. While there is usually a core of relatively stable identities, there may
be may competing identities within a state with various levels of support and saliency.
This allows for identities to change, although usually only very slowly or in response to
social upheaval.
Although identity theories begin at the individual level, it is possible to speak of the
collective identities of states and governments because identity is in part socially derived.
Psychoanalytic theory has suggested processes by which the individual's identity is
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transferred to a national identity and the ways in which the two are linked and often rein¬
force each other.1" Some studies, such as Heradstveit's study of the Arab/Israeli conflict,
have moved away from the individual level and used states or entire societies as the basic
unit of identity.13 Yet the individual remains the source of identity even though that
identity may be collective. Therefore, when speaking about the identity of the state or
other political actor it must be remembered that it is only though the actions and percep¬
tions of individuals that the collective identity is constructed.
Social identity theory suggests that states derive their identity in part from their group
memberships.14 States seek to enhance and protect their identities by sharing them with
other states possessing similar characteristics and interests. States need both allies and
enemies is order to define and enhance their self-esteem.15 This is not to suuuest
that
OO
states which identify with each other are identical or share all interests in common. It is
better thought of as a continuum where the more areas of similarity that exist, the more
likely that there will be a strong identification. The intensity of the identification also
depends upon both the saliency of a particular identity and its centrality to the actor.
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Identifying with some states and not others leads to the formation of in-groups and
out-groups.16 The in-group can be trusted because it is similar while out-groups are
viewed with suspicion because they are different.17 By perceiving one's own group in
positive terms, members enhance their own self worth. Members of the in-group are
considered good, moral, as conforming to acceptable standards of behavior, and generally
"better" than other groups. Out-group members are considered bad, immoral, weak and
as engaging in unacceptable behavior. Classification as either part of an in-group or outgroup is not always clearly defined but is dependent upon how strongly the states identify
with each other. This process of in-group/out-group differentiation helps define the
identity of the state and thus its interests.18 The need to enhance its identity leads group
members to discriminate in favor of their in-group even when it leads to less than optimal
results.19
The in-group/out-group distinction forms an important basis for determining who is an
enemy and who is ally and thus helps to define a state's security interests. "Identification
with or against a group allows actors to make relatively quick and easy judgments,
including predictions about who will be friendly and who will not in a given
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environment."20 In-group members, are perceived as allies on the basis of shared charac¬
teristics and common interests. Out-group members are perceived as enemies because
they do not share the same values and thus are bad. This is not to suggest that other
factors do not influence this determination. A history of conflict, competing interests,
lack of economic or diplomatic ties all contnbute to the characterization of a state as an
enemy; however these factors often reinforce or are a product of the in-group/out-group
classification.
For instance, the role of culture has independently been studied as a source of conflict.
Predictions of future conflict based upon cultural factors recently received attention21 and
research has shown support for the theory that culture influences threat perception.22 One
theory argues that war is not due to the innate nature of man, but is a cultural phenome¬
non that depends upon a number of complex sociological and psychological conditions.23
Social identity theory also sees culture as a factor which influences conflict because it is a
component of identity. Those whose culture is familiar are perceived as part of the ingroup while those who are dissimilar are viewed with suspicion. Thus the distinction
between the role identity plays and other factors in influencing threat perception is not
clear. They often reinforce each other and are not mutually exclusive.
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Misperception and Attribution Bias

Images of the enemy or out-group are often subject to distortion and misperception.
Image theory has explored the question of how the enemy is perceived.24 There are four
basic elements which make up the image of the enemy.25 First, the enemy is often per¬
ceived to be the opposite, or the "mirror-image" of a state's perception of itself. What¬
ever characteristics a state finds positive about itself it finds lacking in the enemy.
Second, contradicting images of the enemy can exist at the same time. A state may be
perceived as both extremely dangerous and weak with no apparent conflict. Third, the
image of the enemy is dynamic. An enemy today can easily become an ally tomorrow.
Fourth, there is the need to de-humanize the enemy. This can be seen in the tendency to
demonize the enemy.
Theories on enemy images have benefitted from work on schemas. A schema is a
cognitive tool which aids a person is sorting and classifying new information based on
generic knowledge and previous experience.26 Certain images which are related tend to
be invoked together. For instance, the knowledge that a state is a democracy may invoke
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images such as peaceful, ally, and liberal. Schemas can help to fill in gaps in knowledge.
Thus, if a state is perceived to be an enemy, other characteristics associated with the
enemy schema will be attributed to that state.
Besides distorting the images of enemies and allies, the need to enhance its identity
leads a state to discriminate in favor of its in-group. These in-group biases, which may
be motivated or cognitive, affect how policymakers interpret the behavior of states and
perceive and cope with threat.27 Motivated biases consist of failures to recognize, con¬
sider relevant, or act on information which is inconsistent with the need to perceive ingroup members as good and out-group members as bad.28 For instance, subjects have
been found not to recall information inconsistent with their conception of their own
nations.29 Cognitive biases on the other hand arise from "the decision-makers' inherently
limited capacity for perception, recall, and attribution of meaning."30 In essence these
biases are the result of misperception. Several types of cognitive bias affect decisionmakers such as attribution bias and the inability to empathize.31
Misperception within the field of foreign policy has been found to occur in some pre¬
dictable patterns, one of which is attribution bias.32 This study plans to focus upon
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attribution biases which occur in response to the need to enhance identity. Just as with
identity theory, studies of attribution bias begin at the individual level; however, resear¬
chers have noted that "the cognitive and motivational biases impairing rationality that
have attracted attention are rooted not only in the information-processing proclivities of
individuals but also in the operational codes, understandings, and worldviews shared by
decision makers and diffused throughout society."33 This British school approach which
focuses upon societal attributions has been used to study collectively held misperceptions
and how patterns of misperception may vary across cultures.34
In general, attribution theory refers to "an area of study in social psychology regarding
the causal inferences people make about social behavior."35 Attribution bias says that a
state will attribute motivations differently based upon whether a state is an enemy or ally.
This fundamental attribution error overestimates dispositional factors and underestimates
situational factors.36 Dispositional factors are those which are intrinsic to the state such
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as type of government and characteristics of the state such as neutral or fundamentalist.
Regular patterns of behavior are also dispositional factors providing they are not in
response to a sustained unusual event. Situational factors are unusual external events
over which the state has little or no control.
Later work on this theory found more support for it when evaluative aspects were
taken into account.37 For instance, it was found that an enemy's negative behavior was
attributed to internal factors, but that positive behavior was attributed to situational
factors. Conversely, a state's own positive behavior was attributed to its internal charac¬
ter, while negative behavior was seen as induced by the situation. This self-serving bias
results from the state's attempt to defend its identity and usually leads to an overestimation of threat from an enemy.38
An important point needs to be made about misperception and identity. Cognitive
processes and perception play a large role in defining the identities of states and in the
creation of in-group biases; however, a state's perception of identity, both its own and
others, does not necessarily reflect reality. A state may want to believe itself to be
democratic, but this does not make it true. Yet a state will take action based upon its
perception, not upon reality. Conversely, perceptions are not always wrong. While ingroup biases make misperception more likely, they do not make it unavoidable or auto¬
matic. Sometimes a state perceives threat because there really is a threat; however,
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unless the state understands how it misperceives it cannot tell the difference between an
imaginary and a real threat.

US Identity and Perceptions

It has been a source of debate as to what values or characteristics comprise the identity
of the US in part because there are so many competing subcultures and identities within
American political culture.39 Most studies on US identity or nationalism find that the
values of economic and political liberalism are central to how the US defines and per¬
ceives itself.40 Basically liberalism can be defined as the belief that "legitimate political
power arises only from the consent of the governed."41 This is extended to the economic
sphere to mean acceptance of free market capitalism.
In relation to US nonproliferation policy, social identity theory says that the US will
be motivated to enhance its identity by discriminating in favor of its in-group or allies,
and discriminating against its out-group or enemies.42 Thus the same behavior by an
enemy and an ally will be perceived differently.
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States which share a liberal, democratic identity with the US will be perceived as
friendly, trustworthy, and complying with international norms. Violations of norms will
be discounted, ignored, or attributed to forces beyond the control of the state and explan¬
ations will be accepted.43 Thus the nuclear program of an ally will be attributed to situational factors and not to the character of the state. Since this behavior is seen as an
aberration and not reflective of the true desires of the state, it is considered understand¬
able and thus less threatening. The US is able to empathize with this state because it
perceives it as being forced to develop nuclear weapons by factors beyond its control.
This is similar to the US's argument that it must maintain a nuclear arsenal to deter
aggression, not because it is aggressive.
Conversely, states with which the US does not identify itself will be "viewed more
suspiciously and are often pejoratively classified as an out-group with a set of derogatory
attributes that differentiate them from the community of democratic states."44 The
nuclear program of a rogue state is attributed to the disposition of that state which the US
sees in negative terms and in contrast to its own positive characteristics. Since this
behavior is perceived as an innate desire of the state, it is perceived as more threatening.
Perceptions of states which do not clearly fit into the in-group or out-group categories
will be more ambiguous.
The presence of attribution bias among US policymakers will be determined by a
content analysis of official documents from the executive branch. These documents will

43

Chafetz, "Political Psychology," 754.

""Hermann and Kegley, "Rethinking Democracy," 517.

57
be examined in order to reveal whether the US attributes the motivations behind the
nuclear programs of enemies and allies differently.

CHAPTER 5
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Content Analysis

Content analysis is defined as "a research technique for making replicable and valid
inferences from data to their context."1 There are many techniques available for conduct¬
ing content analysis such as frequency counts2 or thematic density3; however, there is no
single correct way to do content analysis.4 The technique used should be dependent upon
the nature of the study. While using a previously designed methodology provides the
researcher with a proven method, it is possible and sometimes necessary to apply content
analysis in new ways as long as it conforms to the criteria of replicability and validity.5
Although content analysis is a relatively common technique, there are criticisms of its
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utility. Can intentions, motivations, or actual beliefs be inferred from what a person
says? Do written statements really reflect policy or are they merely rhetoric or outright
lies? Undoubtedly statements do not reflect a situation or belief with complete accuracy.
While this may be more troubling for an analysis of an individual, it creates less prob¬
lems for a study using a social group as its unit of analysis.

Since the purpose of this

study is to study a phenomenon which exists socially, attribution bias, there must be
some connection between it and the way in which it is expressed—language.
Discussing the problems of content analysis leads to a similar problem with reliance
upon official documents and statements. There are two problems, the use of rhetoric and,
for lack of a better term, a political restraint, in the language of official documents. Rhe¬
toric can be basically defined as "the management of symbols in order to coordinate
social action"6 and its presence is not a hindrance to this study. The nationally held
beliefs and images of the enemy which are invoked by attribution bias are almost
assuredly a part of political rhetoric. Rhetoric is often used to help create and sustain a
nation's perception of its identity.7
The second problem with reliance on official documents for content analysis is more
problematic. Political restraint is being used to mean the act of refraining from saying
what might be true, but which is imprudent to say. It is almost a political correctness.
For instance, policymakers rarely refer to states specifically when discussing
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nonproliferation in universally applicable terms. This is because it is unwise to single out
some states for criticism and not others when trying to promote universal standards.
Similarly, Israel's nuclear program is rarely mentioned. This is not because it does not
exist or they do not have views on it; however, to acknowledge it is to invite criticism
and questions of discrimination.
In this study, content analysis will be used to infer beliefs or assumptions made by the
sender of the message. The sender of the message will not be the individual, but the
policy making establishment of the United States government. In order to test the hypo¬
thesis that US policymakers are subject to attribution bias, a content analysis of official
statements and documents emanating from the executive branch will be undertaken. The
focus will be on the executive branch because it is primarily involved in the creation and
implementation of nonproliferation policy.3 The purpose of this content analysis is to
infer from these documents whether the US exhibits attribution bias and associates the
nuclear programs of enemy states with their character which is perceived in negative
terms.

Research Design

A post-1990 time frame was chosen because nonproliferation has become a more
prominent foreign policy goal since the end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War.
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Since more attention has been focused on the issue, it appears more frequently in official
documents.
Five states have been chosen for a content analysis of US statements toward them and
will be presented in a case study format. Four ot the states are those most commonly
referred to as rogues by the US during this time period. They are Iraq, Iran, Libya, and
North Korea and are perceived as enemies of the US based on the following factors.
First, the US government, by referring to these states as rogues, has itself defined them as
supporting policies which conflict with its national interest. Second the US has a history
of conflict with each of these states. Third, the US does not maintain diplomatic ties with
these states nor strong economic ties.
For comparative purposes, statements toward Pakistan will be examined. Pakistan is
perceived as an ally based on the following factors. First, the US defines Pakistan as an
ally and as maintains good diplomatic relations with it. Second, the US has a history of
cooperation and friendship with it. Although Israel represents a better example of an
American ally, its nuclear program is so overlooked that it has never been acknowledged,
nor is it mentioned in official statements.
The first part of the case study will reflect the findings of the content analysis in quan¬
titative terms. The description of the research design will be presented in four sections:
1) how the sample was derived, 2) how the text was coded and the recording scheme, 3)
what the construct for inference is, and 4) how the results will be analyzed. The second
half of the case study will be devoted to a qualitative discussion based upon selected
sections of text.
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Deriving the Sample

Deriving a sample of documents for the content analysis is necessary because the
population of possible documents is enormous and would include at a minimum all
presidential speeches and statements, all Congressional testimony given by members of
the executive branch, and all interviews, speeches and press releases from all executive
agencies and departments. The population could even be expanded beyond the executive
branch to include statements by members of Congress, political analysts, and news com¬
mentators. The argument this thesis makes is that attribution bias is found across the
spectrum of government policymakers and is a widely held assumption; however, this
thesis has limited itself to the perceptions of the executive branch because it is most
active in nonproliferation policy.
A sample of documents from the executive branch has been chosen using as a source
U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-ROM, Volume 4, Number 1 which covers a time period of
January 1990 to May 1996.9 Although the sample of documents contained on the CD
was not chosen randomly from the entire population, it is still random in the sense that
the documents were chosen with no regard for the research of this study. The benefit of
using this source instead of drawing an independent sample is that it makes it possible to
search a large number of documents, thereby expanding the reliability of the findings.

9

The information included on the CD spans 6 major publication groups and includes
approximately 492 separate publications and eight regional maps. The six major
publications are the US Department of State Dispatch, Dispatch Supplements, Country
Background Notes, Daily Press Briefing Transcripts, Congressional and Special Reports,
and Regional Maps.
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The documents drawn for the sample were those contained in the "speeches, testimony,
statements" category. Documents within this category are mainly composed of speeches
and testimony by a member of the executive branch published in the US Department of
State Dispatch.
To obtain the document sample for each state, the name of the state was searched for
within the database. The subject search was not used because it excluded documents
which only briefly mentioned one of the states, but which could be relevant to the study.
This is because it is the text of the documents which is important to this study, not the
documents themselves nor, to lesser extend, their context. Therefore, even fairly mean¬
ingless references to the state become important for what they say or do not say.

Coding and Recording Scheme

In order to analyze the text, the concepts of interest must be given indicators. The
three concepts of interest are the nuclear program of each state, references to character or
dispositional factors, and references to situational factors. Differences between situational and dispositional attributions are not always clear as "most situational explanations
imply assumptions about relevant dispositions."10 This has created problems for the
measurement of attribution bias. In order to clarify the distinction the following
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definitions will be used." Situational attributions are those explanations that state or
imply no dispositions on the part of the actor beyond those typical of all or most actors.
Dispositional attributions are those explanations that state or imply something unique or
distinguishing about the actor. Another problem in the measurement of attribution arises
from the difference between character and behavior. Information on whether attributions
related to character and behavior are different have been mixed.12 For the purposes of
this study, no difference will be assumed; behavior will be considered an indicator of
character. Other research has found that in order to be meaningful, behavior must also be
distinguished by whether it is intentional or unintentional.13 This study avoids this
problem by focusing upon a behavior which cannot be considered anything but
intentional—the creation of a nuclear weapons program.
A reference to the nuclear weapons program of a state will be indicated if the terms
"nuclear weapons," "weapons of mass destruction (WMD)," "unconventional weapons"
or "sensitive, dual-use technology" are mentioned in relation to the state's attempts to
produce or acquire them. Subsequent references made indirectly by referring back to the
program will also be included as long as the reference is clear. For instance, if the WMD
program has already been mentioned and then a reference is made to the state's "efforts"

"Lee Ross, "The Intuitive Psychologist and his Shortcomings: Distortions in the
Attribution Process," in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. Leonard
Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1977), 5.
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Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 23 (1987): 47.
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or to "the program", this will be considered a reference to its nuclear program. Although
WMD can refer to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, a reference to WMD will be
taken as an indicator of its weapons program because it is usually meant to refer to all of
these weapons. A reference specifically to a chemical or biological program will not be
considered. Nor will general references to arms sales be considered unless it is made
clear within the document that the arms include nuclear technology.
The definition for a reference to the character of a state is more subjective. The US's
perception of each state's character will not be assumed but will be denved from the text.
Therefore, a reference to the character of a state will be taken to mean any adjective that
is used to describe the state, its actions or its government. References to the actions,
behavior, or intentions of the state will also be taken as indicators of character. Through
a preliminary examination of the documents for the rogue states, character references
were found to fall into three broad categories: direct character references, behaviors, and
intentions.

While these categories do have some over-lap, each characteristic will be

placed into the one category it most closely fits.
Direct character references are descriptions about the nature of the state. These would
include descriptions of the government such as dictatorship or nondemocratic. Other
direct character references could be isolated, fanatical or rejectionist. All these terms
describe a relatively permanent aspect of the state. Other terms which will be considered
direct character references will be rogue, outlaw and pariah. Although the definition of
these terms includes ideas about behavior, character and intentions, they are intended as a
description of the state.

Behavior is any action, physical or symbolic, taken by the state. This would include
sponsoring terrorism, using violence, developing chemical and biological weapons, and
opposing the peace process. In general these behaviors are seen to violate current inter¬
national standards of behavior.
Intentions are considered to be any description of the purpose behind the actions and
character of the state. In many cases, intentions and behavior may overlap. For example,
references to threats from a state may be taken as behavior, or as its intention to threaten.
In general, intentions will refer to actions which the US thinks or expects a state may
take. Intentions are usually vague such as mention of offensive capabilities, blackmail,
threats, and efforts to control or dominate a region or resources.
References to situational or external factors refer to factors beyond the control of the
state. These may include changes in the international system, security concerns or econ¬
omic pressure. External factors are unusual circumstances which the majority of states
do not encounter on a regular basis.
Although it does make coding problematic, this type of open-ended coding provides
greater flexibility and allows for characteristics which the coder may not anticipate.14
This technique is especially useful when no previous research has been conducted.
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Construct for Inference

In order to be able to infer an association between the nuclear weapons program of a
state and its character from the sample of documents, a recording scheme for the indica¬
tors was created to determine if a pattern of co-occurrence exists. Co-occurrence refers to
frequencies and patterns of word pairs within a document.15 This type of inference is also
called contingency analysis which involves counting how often a symbol appears in
conjunction with another symbol.16 Work done thus far on co-occurrences suggests that
"above and below chance co-occurrences of references to concepts within a stream of
discourse indicate cognitive associations and dissociations, respectively."1

Thus fre¬

quent and spatially close references to both the nuclear program of a state and its charac¬
ter traits would indicate a cognitive association between the concepts.
The recording scheme for determining co-occurrence will be as follows. All refer¬
ences to the nuclear program of a state within each document will be noted, if they occur.
References to both dispositional and situational factors will also be noted, if they occur in
the same sentence as the reference to the nuclear program or if it appears within one
sentence of the reference, before or after. This will be considered a co-occurrence. Al¬
though character references will be separated by type (i.e. character, behavior, intentions),
the important distinctions for this research are whether or not a characterization was made
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and if it is positive or negative.

A narrow range for the co-occurrence is used to enhance

the validity that the two terms are associated.
There are two limits to the reliability of the recording scheme. First, only one coder is
being used; however, the instructions are explicit enough that judgment calls are mini¬
mized and replicability is possible. Second, because of the limited search capability of
the database, all counts, except for the sample number of documents for each state, must
be done by hand; however, this does allow for greater flexibility in determining indirect
indicators. The question of reliability will be minimized by the qualitative discussion of
the findings.
The construct for inferring a co-occurrence will be based on "the relative frequency of
the observed contextual dependencies."18 If a reference to the nuclear program of a state
is mentioned, then does a character reference also occur? The analysis of the relative
frequency of these two indicators occurring together will have two parts. First, the rela¬
tive frequency of co-occurrences for each state will be determined using each reference
to the nuclear program of the state. Support for attribution bias would be indicated by a
high relative frequency of co-occurrences; however, it could be possible that a high co¬
occurrence would be due to other factors such as the terms are logically co-dependent.
Therefore the second part of the analysis will compare the results of each state to the
same analysis for Pakistan. By comparing the four rogue states to Pakistan it can be
determined whether or not the distribution of the two concepts among the rogue states is
normal for all states, or is specific to the rogue states. Even if the relative frequency of
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co-occurrences among the rogue states is low, a significantly higher or lower frequency
for Pakistan would indicate a difference. Additionally, the results will be analyzed by
type of characteristic to see if any patterns emerge.

Example

The following excerpt will be used to demonstrate how the text will be coded.
When such leaders sit atop regional powers, such as Iran and Iraq, they may engage in
violence and lawlessness that threaten the United States and other democracies. Such
reactionary, "backlash" states are more likely to sponsor terrorism and traffic in
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies. They are more likely
to suppress their own people, foment ethnic rivalries, and threaten their neighbors.19
The reference to the nuclear program of both Iran and Iraq occurs in the second
sentence of the example and the sentence before and after are included. References to
character include "reactionary", "backlash" and "regional power". References to
behavior include engaging in violence, lawlessness, sponsoring terrorism, suppressing
their own people, fomenting ethnic rivalries and threatening neighbors, the US and other
democracies. At first it would appear that the references to behavior would be coded as
intentions; however, it has been established that the US sees these states as engaging in
these activities, not merely intending to do so. No situational references were noted.
Table 1 provides an example of how the text will be coded into quantitative data.
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Table 1. Coding Example for Content Analysis
Total Documents
References to Nuclear Weapons Program
Number of Character Co-occurrences
Number of Situational Co-occurrences

1
1
1
0

The total number of co-occurrences is based upon each reference to the nuclear
weapons program. Therefore, although many references were made to the character of
Iraq in the example, since there was only one mention of the nuclear program, there can
be only one co-occurrence. In Table 2, the types of co-occurrences are broken down to
provide more information about what types of references were made.

Table 2. Coding Fxnmple for Dispositional Co-occurrences
Type of Co-occurrence

a

%

Direct Character
Intentions
Behavior

1 100
0
0
1 100

Note: Percentages based upon 1 dispositional co-occurrence. Percentages will not add to
100%.

This breakdown acknowledges that several different character references may be made
in conjunction with one reference to the nuclear weapons program; however, although
several different direct character and behavior references were made, they were counted
as one co-occurrence. This was done to prevent the data from distorting how often these
types of references are made.
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The second part of the analysis will be qualitative and use text examples from the
sample of documents. The qualitative examples will highlight any patterns found in the
quantitative data. This discussion will also provide greater detail such as variation across
time, emergent patterns and differences between the cases.

CHAPTER 6
IRAQ

Iraq's nuclear program began in the 1970s when it contracted to purchase the Osiraq
research reactor from France.1 Although Iraq was party to the Nonproliferation Treaty
and its nuclear facilities were under inspection by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), Israel, fearful of Iraq's intentions, bombed Osiraq in June 1981.2 After
the destruction of the reactor, Iraq began a clandestine program in 1982 code named
"Petrochemical 3."3 It was not until after the Persian Gulf War, that the extent of this
program was discovered.
In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687 which
established procedures for "the destruction of Iraq's unconventional weapons and ballistic
missile capabilities and a subsequent monitoring program to prevent their reconstruc¬
tion."4 When inspections were begun under the auspices of the United Nations Special
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), the IAEA discovered that Iraq had made substantial
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progress in developing uranium enrichment technology and weapon designs. Some
estimated that Iraq had been only a couple of years away from having a fully assembled
device. This research occurred in violation of Iraq's NPT obligations and while under
IAEA inspections.
Since 1991 numerous inspection teams have discovered, documented and destroyed
Iraq's capacity to build weapons of mass destruction; however, the delays and deceit by
Iraqi officials have raised fears of hidden materials.5 Also, many of the scientists and
technicians who contributed to the program remain in Iraq. Even so, Iraq's current ability
to produce weapons of mass destruction is curtailed by the destruction of its facilities,
sanctions, and continued monitoring by the IAEA and UN.

US Relationship and Policy

Throughout the 1980s, the US and Iraq enjoyed semi-friendly relations. The US
supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War, maintained diplomatic and economic relations, and
provided loans in the form of grain credits. US nonproliferation policies were laxly
enforced against Iraq and many of the materials used in its weapons program were pro¬
cured from the US and other Western nations. Further, the bulk of the funding for its
nuclear weapons program went through an Atlanta branch of the Italian National Bank.
This relationship drastically changed when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Soon
Iraq had changed from an ally to a state compared to Nazi Germany and the Soviet
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Union.6 Iraq became the first official rogue state targeted by the US. The subsequent
discovery of its nuclear weapons program added to the image.
US nonproliferation policy toward Iraq since 1990 is closely intertwined with the
broad array of policies designed to oust Iraq from Kuwait, protect its minority popula¬
tions and end its support for terrorism. Unofficially it is hoped that these policies will
remove Saddam Hussein from power. Iraq has been subject to numerous UN Secunty
Council Resolutions. These have mandated Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, the destruc¬
tion of its nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities, an end to its repression of minori¬
ties, an end to its support for terrorism, and war reparations to Kuwait. Until Iraq
complies with these resolutions, it remains under UN sanctions restricting both its
imports and exports. The US insists that Iraq must meet all UN Resolutions before any
sanctions are lifted. Despite Iraq's compliance with many of the resolutions and increas¬
ing opposition from other states such as France which feel it is time to begin removing
sanctions, sanctions remain in effect.

In several instances, the US unilaterally changed

the requirements for the lifting of sanctions.8
The hypothesis of this thesis is that US policymakers are affected by attribution bias in
their perceptions of Iraq. These biases are generated in part by the relationship between
the US and Iraq. This leads to an overperception of threat which is reflected in the harsh
policies adopted. Iraq's nuclear program is considered the result of its aggressive and
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ambitious government and is a symbol of its hostile intentions. This perception linking
the nuclear program to the character of the state heightens the sense of threat and discour¬
ages diplomacy.

Content Analysis

In conducting the content analysis, the source yielded 466 documents which pertained
to Iraq between the period January 1990 and May 1996. The qualitative results showing
the dispositional and situational co-occurrences for Iraq are shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Iraq: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences
# of co-occurrences

_iL

Dispositional (negative) 151 74.8
Situational 1
0.0
Note: Percentages are based upon a total of 202 references to the nuclear program of Iraq.

Of the 202 separate references to the nuclear program of Iraq, 151 co-occurred with a
negative reference to the character of Iraq resulting in a 74.8% co-occurrence. There was
only one situational co-occurrence. These data indicate that US policymakers associated
the character of Iraq with its nuclear program. In Table 4 the breakdown of specific
dispositional and situational references by type is shown.
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Table 4. Iraq: Dispositional and Situational References
DIRFCT THARACTF.R RF.FF.RF.NCFS
pariah/outlaw/rogue/renegade
backlash/reactionary
repressive dictatorship/undemocratic/despot
ambitious
madman
untrustworthy
malevolent
isolated
INTENTIONS
attack other states
target capitals
offensive missile capability
weapons beyond defensive needs
threat to regional and international peace and stability
threaten neighbors and US interests
rebuild WMD
blackmail
sow violence and disorder
dominate the Middle East
control energy supplies of the world
regional hegemony
revive a hot war
expansionistic
RFHAVIOR
threatens/intimidates
neighbors
United States
other democracies
democratic rights of its citizens
enemy of the Middle East peace process
sponsors terrorism
contributing to tensions
possesses biological and chemical weapons
used chemical weapons
uses violence
militarizing
invaded its neighbors and Kuwait
continued dispute with Kuwait
foments ethnic rivalries
human rights abuses
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Table 4-Continued
inhumane policies
dangerous
repressive
aggressive
lawless
brutal
unpeaceful
contempt for civilized rules
manipulates hostages
noncompliance with UN resolutions and IAEA
hiding biological program
intimidates the UN
noncooperation
deceives and threatens inspectors
denies nuclear program
lied
interfering with humanitarian efforts
unconditionally accepted UN Resolution 687
SITUATIONAL
insecurity due to the collapse of the USSR

All of the dispositional references made were negative except one. The one positive
behavior reference, Iraq's unconditional acceptance of UN Resolution 687 mandating the
destruction of its WMD facilities, occurred in June 1991, before Iraq began evading com¬
pliance. The term "isolated" could be taken as an indicator of Iraq's insecurity. Yet in
the context used, it referred to Iraq's isolation from the international community brought
about by its behavior. The frequency of dispositional references by type in Table 5
shows that the majority of dispositional references were to Iraq's behavior.
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Table 5. Iraq: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type
Type of Co-occurrence

&

%_

Direct Character 37 24.5
Intentions 49 32.5
Behavior 114 75.5
Note: Totals based upon 151 negative dispositional co-occurrences. Each type of
reference as a percentage of the total references to the nuclear program (202): direct
character, 18.3%; intentions, 24.3%; and, behavior, 56.4%.

The majority of the character references to Iraq concerned its behavior which occurred
in 75.5% of the co-occurrences. The predominant themes of behavior were Iraq's aggres¬
sion and its unwillingness to comply with international standards and UN Resolutions.
There was a low co-occurrence with direct character references, 24.5%. Many of the
character references, such as madman, malevolent, dictator, ambitious, and untrustwor¬
thy, referred specifically to Saddam Hussein. This suggests that the US attributes the
actions of Iraq, including its nuclear program, to the personality of Saddam Hussein.
This is supported by the frequent statement by the US during and after the Gulf War that
its quarrel was not with the people of Iraq, but with its government.9
The co-occurrence of intentions, 32.5%, reveals that the US has little trust in Iraq and
believes that it fully intends to continue its aggressive policies and weapons program as
soon as sanctions are removed.
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These findings support the hypothesis that the US executive branch exhibits attribu¬
tion bias in its perceptions of Iraq's nuclear program. Iraq's nuclear program is a
reflection of its character, embodied in Saddam Hussein, and its unacceptable behavior.
The program was not attributed to situational factors.

Discussion

Between January 1990 and 1 August 1990, there were no references to Iraq's nuclear
program. References began after its invasion of Kuwait. During the Persian Gulf War
there was a 100% co-occurrence between references to its nuclear program and negative
character references. Since the end of the war, the percentage of co-occurrences re¬
mained above 63%.
Although the most prominent character reference was "rogue", many character
references centered on Saddam Hussein and attributed the nuclear program to his per¬
sonal ambitions. As George Ward, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International
Organizations Affairs, said.
Coupled with the continuation of his tyrannical practices, Saddam Hussein's efforts to
evade the eliminations of his weapons of mass destruction complete the portrait of a
classic dictator, dangerous both to his own people and to his neighbors.10

10George F. Ward Jr., "Iraq's Non-Compliance with UN Security Council
Resolutions," (statement before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and
on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Commit¬
tee, Washington DC, 29 July 1992) US Department of State Dispatch 3, no. 31 (3 August
1992): 602-611, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l
(Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)
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By linking the nuclear program to the personality of Hussein, the US feels it is unable
to trust Iraq until he is removed from power.
The most frequent type of co-occurrence links the behavior of Iraq to its quest for
nuclear weapons. By linking its violations of international standards to its nuclear
program, the idea is reinforced that Iraq would not hesitate to violate other standards such
as the use of nuclear weapons. In a 1995 speech, Deputy Secretary Talbott cited several
of Iraq's concerning behaviors in conjunction with its nuclear program.
As we reward the makers of peace, we must also deal firmly and consistently with the
enemies of peace. That is why it is so important to continue our opposition to Iran and
Iraq, the Middle East's most dangerous actors. These two nations are not only the
most ardent opponents of the Middle East peace process; they are also the world's
most flagrant state sponsors of terrorism—and they both seek to become nuclear
powers."
References to its support for terrorism especially increase the perception of threat
posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of Iraq.
Although references to its behavior predominated, the statements about its intentions
most clearly reveal how the US perceives the nuclear program of Iraq. The next three
text examples incorporate references to character, behavior and intentions. The US
perceives Iraq's intentions for developing nuclear weapons to be solely for the purpose of
aggression. Vice President Quayle made this perception explicit in a 1991 speech.

"Strobe Talbott, "American Leadership in the Post-Cold War World," (remarks to
the Foreign Policy Association, New York City, 24 April 1995) US Department of State
Dispatch 6, no.18 (1 May 1995): 372-376, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CDRom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)
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They [the American people] know that over the past decade, Saddam Hussein has
bankrupted his people to bankroll his army. They know that he has launched two wars
of aggression, against Iran and against Kuwait, at the cost of some 1 million casualties.
They know that he is acquiring a stockpile of chemical and biological agents and has
used chemical weapons against both Iran and his own people. They know he has
launched an intensive campaign to acquire nuclear weapons. .And they know that
unless he is stopped today, nuclear- armed Iraq will control the bulk of the world's
energy supply tomorrow, thereby holding a gun to all our heads.12
President Bush also expressly linked Iraq's nuclear program to Saddam Hussein.
I'm deeply concerned about Saddam's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Imagine his
ability to blackmail his neighbors should he possess a nuclear device. We've seen him
use chemical weapons on his own people. We've seen him take his own country, one
that should be wealthy and prosperous, and turn it into a poor country - all because of
(his) insatiable appetite for military equipment and conquest.13
And Secretary of State James Baker stated in a 1990 speech.
We understand that we can sacrifice now, or we can pay an even stiffer price later as
Saddam moves to multiply his WMD: chemical, biological and, most ominous,
nuclear. And we know that Saddam Hussein has never possessed a weapon that he
hasn't used. And we will not allow the hope for a more peaceful world to rest in the
hands of this brutal dictator.14
The US perceives Iraq as hostile and ambitious. It intends to develop nuclear weapons
in order to dominate the Middle East and blackmail other states. These ambitions are
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part of the character of Iraq and will not be changed by the imposition of sanctions or UN
monitoring. If Iraq were to be released from sanctions, the US believes that it would
instantly revive its nuclear, chemical, and biological programs. This belief is used to
justify the continuation of sanctions even after Iraq has complied with UN Resolutions.
The character of Iraq is personified by Saddam Hussein. Many of the behaviors,
intentions, and character references are made specifically about him. This suggests that
the US's perception of Iraq could change dramatically if he were removed from power.
Although Iraq's program has been dismantled, it remains in the rogue category
because of its efforts to prevent inspections and unwillingness to comply with UN
Resolutions. Iraq's past and present actions have shown it to be aggressive and in viola¬
tion of many international standards. Yet US policy has also been influenced by the
perception that Iraq is determined to build nuclear weapons. While US fears may be
justified, the experience of Iraq has influenced the US's perceptions of the other states
classified as rogues.

CHAPTER 7
IRAN

Iran's nuclear program began under the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and was
inherited by the Khomeini government when it seized power in 1979. The weapons
research continued, but was slowed by the turmoil of the revolution and the following
eight year war with Iraq.1 In 1988, after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran began to re¬
build its nuclear infrastructure and to cultivate relationships with foreign suppliers which
included Argentina, Pakistan, China, North Korea, South Africa, and Russia.2
Despite the acceleration of Iran's nuclear weapons program in the 1990s, it is
believed to be rudimentary and eight to ten years from producing a nuclear device.3 This
time could be shortened with substantial foreign assistance. Iran is a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its nuclear facilities are under International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Iran officially denies that it is pursuing nuclear weapons and
two IAEA inspections have revealed no evidence of NPT violations. Iran says its nuclear
program is intended solely for energy purposes.
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US Relationship and Policy

The US's relationship with Iran has suffered due to their history of conflict. The US
enjoyed good relations with Iran under the Shah's pro-Westem regime. This changed
when the revolution occurred and fifty-two American diplomats were taken hostage. The
US severed diplomatic relations with Iran which have yet to be restored. Iran has been
placed under increasing trade and investment restrictions by the US. These sanctions are
in response to a number of behaviors which include its efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction, support for terrorism, opposition to the Middle East peace process,
threats against its neighbors, and its poor human rights record.4 Despite tensions, the US
has not ruled out the possibility of improved relations if Iran were to modify its behavior.
Since the 1980s, Iran has been subject to a number of export and trade controls from
the US. All dual-use and military items are prohibited from export as well as any addi¬
tional items forbidden under anti-terrorism legislation.5 In 1994 the President issued an
executive order that banned all direct and indirect trade and investment with Iran.6 The
1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act takes sanctions to an extreme and allows the US to
sanction foreign firms doing business with these states. The US has pressed to create
multilateral sanctions on Iran, but has failed to gain the support of the international
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community. It has persuaded some third parties not to make loans or grant debt relief to
Iran.7
After the Persian Gulf War, the US began focusing upon Iran's weapons programs. In
1994 and into early 1995, the US implemented a policy of complete nuclear denial to
Iran.8 Iran argued that this violated Article VI under the NPT which requires the sharing
of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and hinted that it would terminate its NPT
membership. Also in 1994 Russia was pressured into halting the sale of two reactors to
Iran. Although no specific threats were made to Russia, it was implied that if the sale
occurred, Russian aid would need to be reevaluated and that its relationship with the US
would be undermined.9
The hypothesis is that due to the US's antagonistic relationship with Iran, US policy¬
makers are affected by attribution bias in their perceptions of Iran. Iran's nuclear program
will be attributed to its internal character which the US perceives as aggressive and unaccepting of international norms. This perception leads policymakers to overestimate threat
and prefer sanctions and threats to diplomacy.
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Content Analysis

In conducting the content analysis, the source yielded 201 documents pertaining to
Iran between January 1990 and May 1996. In Table 6 the qualitative results showing the
frequencies of dispositional and situational co-occurrences for Iran are shown.

raoie o. iran: uisposuionai ana mmanonai r o-occurrences
# of co-occurrences
Dispositional (negative)
Situational

75
0

%
67.6
0

Note: Percentages are based upon a total of 111 references to the nuclear program of Iran.

Of the 111 separate references to the nuclear program of Iran, 75 co-occurred with a
negative reference to the character of Iran resulting in a 61.6% co-occurrence. There
were no situational co-occurrences. These data indicate that US policymakers attributed
the nuclear program of Iran to its character, not external factors. In Table 7 the break¬
down of specific dispositional references by type is shown.

Table 7. Iran: Dispositional References
DIRF.rT CHAR ATTFR RFFFRF.NCF.S
pariah/rogue/outlaw/renegade
reactionary/backlash
irresponsible
intolerant
truculent
isolated
important
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Table 7-Continued
INTRNTIONS
threat to peace, security and stability
engaged in a military build-up
security risk
blackmail
sow violence and disorder throughout the region and beyond
energetically seek to develop WMD
potential adversary
BF.HAVIOR
supports terrorism
opposes the Middle East peace process
threatens and menaces neighbors and the US
human rights abuses
concerning/unacceptable policies and behavior
uses violence and terror
dangerous
supports extremist groups
intimidates and eliminates opponents
outlaw behavior
assassination
supports terror and subversion
pursues destabilization policies
violates norms and basic standards of international conduct
lawless
suppress its own people
undermines peace
heavy-handed assertion of authority

All of the dispositional references made were negative except one, the character
reference "important." The frequency of dispositional references by type in Table 8
shows that the majority of these references were to Iran's behavior.
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Table 8. Iran: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type
Type of Co-occurrencfi
Direct Character
Intentions
Behavior

21
17
57

28.0
22.7
76.0

Note: Percentages based upon 75 negative dispositional co-occurrences. Each type of
reference as a percentage of the total references to the nuclear program (111): direct
character, 18.9%; intentions, 15.3%; and, behavior, 51.4%.

The majority of the character references to Iran concerned its behavior which occurred
in 76% of the co-occurrences. In general the references were to Iran's threatening
behavior and its violations of international standards. Of the 57 behavior co-occurrences
45 included reference to Iran's support for terrorism.
There were lower co-occurrences with direct character references and intentions.
These references indicated that the US perceived Iran as developing its nuclear program
for aggressive purposes.
These findings support the hypothesis that the US executive branch exhibits attribu¬
tion bias in its perceptions of Iran's nuclear program. Iran's nuclear program is a reflec¬
tion of its character which is most clearly exemplified by its unacceptable behaviors.
There were no references, either directly or indirectly, to any external motivations.

Discussion

No mention was made of Iran's nuclear program during 1990-91, the Persian Gulf War
period. During this time, US references to Iran were cautiously positive, citing its
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noninterference and support for sanctions during the Gulf War. In 1992, the US began
increasingly to focus upon the nuclear program of Iran as a potential Iraq.
By linking Iran's quest for nuclear weapons with other unacceptable behaviors such as
terrorism, the US heightens the perception of threat posed by its program. As Secretary
of State Christopher stated,
Iran's role as the foremost state sponsor of terrorism makes its secret quest for
weapons of mass destruction even more alarming. We must stand together to prevent
Iran from acquiring such threatening capabilities.10
Although support for terrorism is the predominate behavioral reference, the US also
links Iran's nuclear program with a number of other unacceptable behaviors. In a 1995
speech, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Peter Tamoff said.
On April 30 of this year. President Clinton announced his decision to sever all trade
and investment ties between the United States and Iran. These new sanctions represent
American willingness to take actions - even those that may hurt competing US
interests - to increase the cost to Iran of its irresponsible behavior. Iran engages in
terrorism, obstructs the Arab-Israeli peace process, pursues weapons of mass destruc¬
tion, pursues a threatening military build-up in the Persian Gulf, and abuses the human
rights of its citizens. These activities, which threaten important US interests, should be
unacceptable to all members of the international community."
By associating Iran's nuclear program with other unacceptable and aggressive
behaviors, the intentions behind its program become more suspect. The US also
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perceives parallels between the programs of Iran and Iraq which casts further doubts upon
the intentions of Iran. In 1995, Secretary of State Christopher said,
Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons also poses enormous dangers - for countries
in the region and for all of us. Every responsible member of the international commu¬
nity has an interest in seeing those efforts fail. There is absolutely no room for com¬
placency. Remember Iraq: Five years ago, too many were willing to give Saddam
Hussein the benefit of the doubt. We must not make the same mistake with Iran.12
Since the US emphasizes the behavior of Iran, not its form of government or leader, it
is possible that the US would be willing to improve relations with Iran if its behavior
were modified. As Secretary Christopher stated,
Iran is an important country that could make significant contributions to the interna¬
tional community. But first it must end behavior which threatens its neighbors and
seeks to undermine the pursuit of peace. Iran must end its support for terrorism, its
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and its efforts to undermine the peace
process. We will work with our friends in the region and with other nations to make
sure that Iran's leaders under stand the high costs of continuing to pursue destabilizing
policies.13
The US attributes Iran's nuclear program to its hostile character, behavior, and
intentions. Iran is not developing nuclear weapons because of security concerns with Iraq
or Israel, but because of its ambitious and aggressive nature. This perception is reflected
in the US's unwillingness to trust Iran with any type of nuclear technology.
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CHAPTER 8
LIBYA

Libya's first attempt to acquire nuclear weapons occurred in 1970 when it tried to
purchase nuclear arms from China.' Although this attempt failed, Libya, under the
leadership of Muammer Khadafi, continued its pursuit of nuclear weapons by beginning
an indigenous program and through repeated attempts to purchase them. This behavior
occurred despite Libya's accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975.
Libya failed to make substantial progress in its nuclear program via either of these
routes. As of 1995, Libya has made little progress in developing the necessary infrastruc¬
ture to manufacture a nuclear device. It currently possesses one 10 MWt light water
research reactor located at Tajoura which is operating under International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) inspections.2 Likewise, its continued attempts to purchase a nuclear
device, especially since the breakup of the USSR, have been unsuccessful.
The embryonic nature of its nuclear program has not prevented a rhetorical stance by
Libya which identifies it as a proliferation concern. Khadafi has continued to assert that

'Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 141.
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low proliferation risk.
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the Arab states should possess a nuclear device against other nuclear nations such as the
US and Israel. In a 1987 speech, Khadafi stated.
If there is going to be a game using atomic bombs, then it should not be played against
the Arab nation. The Arabs should have it, but we undertake not to drop it on anyone.
However, if someone is going to drop one on us, or if someone is going to threaten our
existence and independence even without the use of an atomic weapon, then we should
drop it on them. This is an essential defensive weapon.3

US Relationship and Policy

The US's perception of Libya is influenced by both its behavior and its rhetoric. Libya
obviously has ambitions to develop nuclear weapons; however, the US's perception is
also influenced by its relationship with Libya. This relationship has continued to decline
since Khadafi came to power in 1969 and the US was forced to evacuate in 1970.4 The
US has not maintained diplomatic relations with Libya since 1981 when it closed the
Libyan embassy in Washington. In 1986, the US bombed Libya for its suspected involve¬
ment in the Berlin discotheque terrorist bombing.5
As with Iraq and Iran, the US has implemented nonproliferation policies against Libya
which are harsher and broader than those applied to other countries. Libya is denied
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nuclear exports. It is also under the same trade and investment restrictions as Iran, in¬
cluding bans on imports and exports, travel and commercial contracts. These sanctions
are in response to a multitude of behaviors including its support for international terror¬
ism, specifically its involvement in the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings. These
incidents also led to UN Security Council Resolutions which the US fully supports.
The hypothesis is that US policymakers are affected by perceptual biases which attrib¬
ute the nuclear program of Libya to its internal character. It wants to develop nuclear
weapons because it is violent, aggressive, and ambitious. The US perceives its nuclear
program as both a result and an indicator of its hostile intentions and character. This
perception heightens the sense of threat from this state. As with Iraq and Iran, this
demonization does not allow for diplomacy or negotiation in dealing with this state.

Content Analysis

In conducting the content analysis, the source yielded 100 documents which pertained
to Libya between the period January 1990 and May 1996. Table 9 shows the quantitative
results of the frequencies of dispositional and situational co-occurrences.

Table 9. Libya: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences
# of co-occurrences

%

Dispositional (negative) 18 85.7
Situational 0
0
Note: Percentages based upon 21 references to the nuclear program of Libya.
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Of the 21 separate references to the nuclear program of Libya, 18 co-occurred with a
reference to the character of Libya, resulting in an 85.7% co-occurrence. There were no
situational co-occurrences. These data indicate that US policymakers attributed the
nuclear program of Libya to its character, not external factors. In Table 10 the break¬
down of specific dispositional references by type is shown.

Table 10. Libya: Dispositional References
DIRF.CT CHARACTF.R RFFFRFNCF
rogue, outlaw, pariah
isolated
force of rejection
no accountability of leaders
INTFNTIONS
poses a threat
weapons for attack
BFHAVTOR
sponsors terrorism
enemy of the peace process
uses violence
destabilizing activities
threatens its citizens
possesses chemical weapons
destabilizing activities
threatens others

All of the references to Libya's character, intentions, and behavior were negative. The
frequencies of dispositional references by type in Table 11 shows that the majority of the
references pertained to Libya's character.
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Table 11. Libya: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type
Type of Co-occurrence

£

%

Direct Character 13 72.2
Intentions 4 22.2
Behavior 11 61.1
Note: Percentages based upon 18 negative dispositional co-occurrences. Each type of
reference as a percentage of the total references to the nuclear program (21): direct
character, 61.9%; intentions, 19.0%; and, behavior, 52.4%.

The most prominent references were to its character which occurred in 72.2% of the
co-occurrences. The most common character reference was rogue, which encompasses
its character, behavior and intentions. The term rogue, pariah, or outlaw occurred in
57.1 % of the co-occurrences. Also there was a strong co-occurrence with its behavior,
especially its support for international terrorism, which occurred in 52.4% of all refer¬
ences to its nuclear program.
The character reference of "isolated" could be understood to mean that Libya is
insecure and therefore feels the need to defend itself; however, as with Iraq, in the con¬
text of the speeches examined, "isolated" referred to the idea that Libya's behavior has
isolated it from the international community and that it needs to be isolated in order to
control its behavior.
These findings support the hypothesis that the US executive branch exhibits attribu¬
tion bias in its perceptions of Libya's nuclear program. Libya's nuclear program is a
refiection of its character and an example of its unacceptable behavior. There were no
references, either directly or indirectly, to any possible external motivation such as pres¬
sure by another state or security concerns.
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Discussion

As with Iran, no mention was made of Libya's program during 1990-91, the Gulf War
period. Beginning in 1992 and steadily increasing each year, the US began focusing
upon Libya as a rogue state and comparing it to Iraq.
Libya provides the fewest references to a nuclear program of the four rogues discus¬
sed. In addition, Libya is often mentioned in conjunction with Iraq and Iran; therefore,
only two additional examples will be discussed here to illustrate the points already made.
First, the US associates Libya's nuclear program with the nature of its regime and
attributes hostile intentions to it. As Robert Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern Affairs, said.
The situation is particularly grim in Iraq and Libya. These outlaw states illustrate the
general point I made earlier: regimes which threaten their citizen's democratic rights
also threaten other regimes and peoples. Acting without accountability, their leaders
have poured their national treasure into militarization and efforts to produce WMD biological, chemical and nuclear. Although the drive to acquire such horrific weapons
was largely designed to attack other states and peoples, Saddam Hussein's use of
chemical weapons on his own people in northern Iraq showed that the line between
domestic and international violence of despots is blurred.6
This statement clearly reflects the belief that Libya's (and Iraq's) purpose in develop¬
ing nuclear weapons is for offensive purposes. By linking its behavior to Iraq, the
inference becomes that Libya would not hesitate to use WMD if acquired, just as Iraq has
done. It also suggests that their drive for WMD is linked to the undemocratic nature of
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these regimes by saying that the leaders have no accountability and threaten their citizens'
democratic rights. As with Iraq, Libya's WMD programs are seen to be the product of the
state's desire, embodied in its leadership.
Second, the US also associates Libya's nuclear program with other unacceptable
behaviors and violations of international standards, especially terrorism. Edward
Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, stated,
We are cooperating closely with the United Nations and a coalition of allies to end
Libyan- sponsored terrorism. The United States is playing a leading role in the inter¬
national effort to ensure that the Libyan Government complies with all aspects of U.N.
Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748, including bringing the perpetrators of
the Pan Am [flight] 103 and UTA [flight] 772 bombings to justice and ceasing its sup¬
port for terrorism and pursuit of non-conventional weapons.~
The association between terrorism and WMD suggests the belief that Libya would use
these weapons in terrorist attacks or provide them to terrorist organizations. In addition,
by associating other unacceptable behaviors with the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the pos¬
sibility that Libya would violate international standards and use nuclear weapons is en¬
hanced. References to its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process reinforces Libya's
unpeaceful image.
While Libya has made the least progress in its weapons program, it has had an
antagonistic relationship with the US longer than Iraq or Iran. Virtually no ties between
Libya and the US exist. Its nuclear program is the most consistently cast in threatening
terms and attributed to the internal character of the state.
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CHAPTER 9
NORTH KOREA

Although North Korea's interest in nuclear weapons dates from the 1950s, there was
no indication of substantial progress until 1984 when the US detected the construction of
a large reactor at Yongbyon.1 North Korea signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in
1985, but did not conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) until April 1992. During that time, North Korea developed an extensive
nuclear weapons program and may have reprocessed enough plutonium to create one or
two nuclear devices."

When the IAEA was allowed to inspect North Korea's facilities in

May 1992, it found discrepancies in its records for plutonium production.3

When the

IAEA called for a special inspection to resolve the discrepancy, North Korea refused and
announced it would withdraw from the NPT.
The crisis over inspections lasted until 21 October 1994 when the US and North Korea
concluded the "Agreed Framework." Under this agreement. North Korea agreed to freeze
construction on its nuclear facilities, allow the IAEA to verify the freeze, not to reprocess

'Michael Mazarr, "Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from
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its spent fuel, and ultimately, to ship all its spent fuel out of the country and dismantle all
its facilities of proliferation concern. In return, North Korea would receive two lightwater reactors, aid in meeting its energy needs, and security assurances. Light-water
reactors are considered proliferation resistant because they produce only small amounts
of plutonium. The US and South Korea would also work to improve relations with North
Korea.4 Improving relations and addressing other issues of concern were considered vital
by the US in the negotiation of the Framework.
Subsequent to the conclusion of the Agreed Framework, the status of North Korea's
nuclear weapons program is uncertain. The US government is optimistic that its program
has been halted and will ultimately be completely dismantled. Critics of the agreement,
however, believe North Korea may be hiding nuclear materials and using the agreement
to give it more time to develop weapons. Their biggest criticism is that North Korea does
not have to submit to inspections until the two light-water reactors are completed. This
could take from four to six years. During that time. North Korea could produce enough
plutonium for several weapons.

US Relationship and Policy

The US and North Korea had a hostile relationship throughout the Cold War period.
They engaged in open hostilities during the Korean War and tensions continued when
North Korea aligned with the Soviet block. The US's security commitment to South
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Korea kept tensions alive through the 1980s. During this time the US and North Korea
maintained no diplomatic or economic ties.
After the collapse of the USSR, there was potential for improved relations. During
this time. North Korea began a dialogue with South Korea and the US on security issues.
In September 1991 President Bush announced the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons
from the Korean peninsula. Later that year, North and South Korea signed a Nonaggression and Reconciliation Agreement and agreed to conduct bilateral inspections on
their nuclear facilities. It also cooperated with the US on MIAs from the Korean War.
These small steps at reducing tensions were hindered when the crisis over inspections
erupted.
Some scholars and politicians believe that North Korea used its nuclear program as
leverage to gain diplomatic recognition from the US and improve relations.5 With the
end of the Cold War, North Korea had lost its major supporter and now found itself more
isolated from the international community than ever before. While Russia and China
moved to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea, the US did not extend similar
overtures to North Korea. The worsening economic conditions further undermined the
regime.

The inspections crisis gave North Korea the leverage to begin a dialogue with

the US on political and economic issues which has improved its international position.
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the US had no nuclear dealings with North Korea.
As a client of the USSR, it was considered the Soviet's nonproliferation concern. Since
the breakup of the USSR, the US has followed a policy of strict technology denial toward
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North Korea. Although concerned over its missile sales to other countries, the US did not
become overly involved in nonproliferation efforts toward it until its attempted with¬
drawal from the NPT. At this time the US's immediate response was to sanction North
Korea by banning arms imports and exports, followed by termination of international
financial dealing if it continued to refuse inspections.6 There was also discussion of
military strikes to destroy its nuclear facilities. Allies of the US such as Japan and South
Korea, opposed sanctions, fearing that they would prompt further proliferation by North
Korea. The crisis was averted when former President Jimmy Carter began mediation
with North Korea which resulted in the "Agreed Framework."
Unlike policy toward the other rogue states, US policy mixed sanctions and threats
with diplomacy and economic incentives. Although the US's initial response was to treat
North Korea as other rogues, two factors prevented this. First, allies pressured the US to
negotiate with North Korea. Second, North Korea's program was more advanced than
the other rogues. It possibly already had a nuclear device. Further, North Korea's isola¬
tion would weaken the impact of any sanctions imposed. At that point, threats would
achieve little where as incentives could induce compliance.
The hypothesis is that US policymakers exhibit attribution bias in their perception of
North Korea's nuclear program. Attributing its program to internal characteristics of the
state leads to overperceptions of threat and possibly to excessive policy options. How¬
ever, since US policy has not been consistently harsh toward North Korea, less attribution
bias may be expected.
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Content Analysis

In conducting the content analysis, the source yielded 200 documents pertaining to
North Korea between January 1990 and May 1996. In Table 12 the quantitative results
indicating the frequencies of dispositional and situational co-occurrences are shown.

Table 12. North Korea: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences
# of co-occurrences

%

Dispositional (negative) 1 12 38.6
Situational 6
2.1
Note: Percentages based upon 290 references to the nuclear program of North Korea.

Of the 290 separate references to the nuclear program of North Korea, 112 cooccurred with a negative reference to the character of North Korea, resulting in a 38.6%
co-occurrence. In addition, there were 6 situational co-occurrences. These data indicate
that US policymakers do not consistently attribute its nuclear program to dispositional
factors. While the situational co-occurrences were not significant, the percentage of
dispositional co-occurrences was much lower than for the other rogue states. In Table 13
the breakdown of specific dispositional and situational references by type is shown.
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Table 1 3. North Korea: Dispositional and Situational References
DIRFCT rHARACTER
pariah/'rogue
isolated
like Iraq
ambitious
fearful of the future
INTENTIONS
threaten
US
South Korea and Japan
Northeast Asia
international peace and security
blackmail
provoke destabilizing nuclear arms race
undermine nonproliferation efforts
sell nuclear weapons to outlaw regimes
military confrontation
target South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and others
extort terms for reunification
undermine regional security
threaten use
REHAVIOR
dangerous
created a crisis
noncompliance with safeguards agreement and NPT obligations
refused to permit full inspections
internal repression
at odds with international community
developed ballistic missiles
military build-up
sold technology to rogue states
threatened NPT withdrawal
support for terrorism
SITUATIONAL
regional political instability
economic hardship
underlying sources to insecurity and instability
difficult relations with Japan
tensions on the peninsula
4 decades of military confrontation
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All of the dispositional references were negative and similar to those made about the
other rogue states. North Korea's nuclear program was associated with its rogue charac¬
ter, hostile intentions, and unacceptable behavior. Yet these associations were not con¬
sistently made and the frequencies of the dispositional references by type in Table 14
show that the majority of them were to North Korea's intentions.

Table 14. North Korea: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type
Type of Co-occurrence

g

%_

Direct Character 16 14.3
Intentions 78 69.6
Behavior 42 37.5
Note: Percentages based upon 112 negative dispositional co-occurrences. Each type of
reference as a percentage of the total references to the nuclear program (290): direct
character, 5.5%; intentions, 26.9%; and, behavior, 14.5%.

The most prominent references were to its intentions which occurred in 69.6% of the
co-occurrences. In 64 of the references, the intent to threaten was mentioned. US policy¬
makers demonstrated the most concern over what North Korea might do, not its current
behavior or character.
These finding provide weak support for the hypothesis that the US executive branch
exhibits attribution bias in its perceptions of North Korea's nuclear program. It did not
consistently attribute its nuclear program to its character and occasionally acknowledged
some situational factors which might contribute to its program. Why the US's perception
of North Korea is different from the other rogues is not clear from the content analysis;
however, pressure from allies and the advanced nature of its program account for the
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willingness to negotiate. It may be that once the US began negotiating it felt the need to
moderate its rhetoric and once an agreement was reached, it felt confident in giving North
Korea the benefit of the doubt.

Discussion

In some ways the US perceives North Korea like the other rogues. It expresses con¬
cern over its past behavior and government and also compares its behavior to Iraq's. In
1995, Secretary of State Christopher stated.
This remains a dangerous world....We have to be constantly vigilant to make sure that
countnes like Iraq and North Korea are denied weapons of mass destruction and pre¬
vented from menacing their neighbors. 7
The majority of the references are to what North Korea would do if it obtained nuclear
weapons. The focus upon its intentions suggests that the US perceives North Korea as a
potential threat, but one that can be prevented. As Craig Johnston, Director of Resources,
Plans, and Policy said.
The agreements which will keep North Korea from developing a nuclear weapons
capability will cost S22 million next year. Compare this with the $4 billion the
Japanese and South Koreans are putting up! Compare this with the costs we will pay if
the effort fails and North Korea develops nuclear weapons with which to blackmail the
world.8
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Despite the perception of hostile intentions, the US has also shown an awareness of
North Korea's security concerns. Although there were only six references to situational
factors, they indicate that the US is not unaware of the external motivations of North
Korea. Thomas McNamara, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, indicated
this when he said,
The breakup of the FSU has, in some cases, increased the level of insecurity of the
FSU's former clients and their motivation to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-D.P.R.K.-are cases in point.9
Additionally, the US made 65 references to the fact that the North Korean nuclear
program was now frozen and would be dismantled. This references could be taken as an
indication of North Korea's behavior, but were not counted as such because the US
usually attributed the freeze to its negotiating powers or to the Agreed Framework and
not to the willingness of North Korea.
Both US statements and its policy reflect a less critical view of North Korea's nuclear
program and a willingness to negotiate. Two factors may account for this. First, rela¬
tions with the US were beginning to improve with the end of the Cold War with the
USSR. Second, North Korea's program is more advanced than the other states. The US
may have felt more of an imperative to negotiate with North Korea because it could
quickly assemble a nuclear device. However, the more moderate rhetoric may simply be

Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public
Affairs, June 1996.)
9

Thomas E. McNamara, "Rethinking Proliferation In the Post-Cold War Era: The
Challenge of Technology," (address to the Wilton Park Special Conference, London, UK,
8 December 1995) US Department of State Dispatch 6, no.50, 51, 52 (December 1995):
928-931, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington
DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)
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attributed to the fact that the US was engaged in negotiations with North Korea and did
not want to jeopardize any agreement. Once negotiations began, it nuclear program was
often referred to as the "nuclear issue" or "nuclear situation" and not as a weapons
program. In this way the threatening aspects of the program were downplayed as the US
negotiated.
US policymakers did not exhibit strong attribution bias in their statements about North
Korea's nuclear program. Although they did not attribute it to situational factors, they
did not consistently see it as a reflection North Korea's desire or hostile intentions.
Despite this ambiguity, North Korea is still classed as a rogue which suggests that the US
may have only moderated its rhetoric due to the negotiations; however, if the Agreed
Framework is successful and relations improve, North Korea may move out of the rogue
category.

CHAPTER 10
PAKISTAN

Pakistan became interested in nuclear power as an energy source during the 1950s.1 It
was not until 1972, after defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, that Pakistan secretly
began its nuclear weapons program.2 By the early 1980s, it had made substantial pro¬
gress by acquiring materials and expertise from abroad. Pakistan's Cold War relationship
with the US during the 1980s exempted it from the majority of US nonproliferation
legislation and allowed it to acquire technology it otherwise would not have been able to
obtain. There were also rumors of Chinese assistance is the form of weapons designs.
By the late 1980s, the US was aware that Pakistan's program had reached the ad¬
vanced stages. After 1990, the US assumed that Pakistan was able to manufacture a
nuclear device within a few days, although most intelligence sources agreed that Pakistan
had chosen not to assemble a completed nuclear device. Any doubts about Pakistan's
ability to manufacture a nuclear weapon were dispelled when it tested five nuclear
devices in late May 1998 in response to a series of Indian tests earlier in the month.

'Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Injluence
Relationship (New York: Praeger, 1982), 116.
2

Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 97.
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Pakistan is not a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The majority of its
nuclear facilities are not under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.3
Pakistan has been willing to discuss joining the NPT, but only in tandem with India.
Until its 1998 tests, Pakistan remained officially vague about its nuclear capabilities.

US Relationship and Policy

In comparison to the rogue states, Pakistan has enjoyed a better relationship with the
US. Yet it has not been without tension. Since Pakistan's creation in 1947, their rela¬
tionship has fluctuated between friendship and alliance to distrust and apathy.4 During
the 1950s and again in the 1980s the two states cultivated a relationship based on security
interests. At other times their interests have diverged because US security interests
focused upon the USSR while Pakistan's main concern was India. For instance, when the
US provided arms to India in 1962 in response to its conflict with China, Pakistan be¬
came distrustful of the US's commitment to it. The relationship also stagnated during the
1970s while the US pursued detente with the USSR because Pakistan's strategic value as
a buffer state was lessened.5 After the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the relation¬
ship again improved as the US began supplying Pakistan with large amounts of military
aid in order to combat Soviet aggression.

3

Ibid., 101.

4
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These types of fluctuations have also occurred in the US's relationships with several of
the rogue states; however, there are some notable differences. First, unlike the rogue
states, the US and Pakistan have not engaged in open hostilities. Downturns in relations
with Iraq and Iran led to military actions and the severing of diplomatic ties. Second, the
US sees Pakistan as pro-Western and acknowledges its democratic institutions. There is
also cooperation between them on issues such as terrorism and drug trafficking.
When the rogue image began to take shape in the late 1980s, Pakistan was considered
a potential rogue;6 however, it remained outside of this category in part because of its
continued strategic value. In addition, the history of cooperation between the two states
allowed the US to identify in some ways with Pakistan and thus influenced its perception
of Pakistan. Pakistan was seen in a better light and given the benefit of the doubt in
many cases. For instance, the US is quick to acknowledge Pakistan's development of
democratic institutions despite the fact that before 1988 there had not been a democra¬
tically elected government in almost two decades. In comparison, Iran is rarely given
credit for its democratic institutions by the US. Thus areas of common interest and a
history of co-operation create a better relationship and a basis for identification between
the US and Pakistan.
US nonproliferation policy toward Pakistan has been a mixture of sanctions and diplo¬
macy. In the 1980s, Pakistan's nuclear program was overlooked in order to maintain its
friendship. The US finally took action in 1990 when President Bush failed to certify that
Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device and sanctions were imposed under the Pressler

6

Klare, Rogue States, 25.

Amendment. Despite tensions over the imposition of sanctions, the US has maintained
diplomatic and economic ties with Pakistan.
During the 1990s US policy has focused on diplomatic pressure and sanctions to
induce India and Pakistan to implement confidence building measures and to work in
parallel in cap and eventually roll-back their nuclear programs. White House officials
feel that the sanctions imposed under the Pressler Amendment impede their nonproliferation efforts rather than enhance them because it prevents closer relations.
In 1998, new sanctions were imposed under the Glenn Amendment for Pakistan's
testing of nuclear devices. Yet even this behavior has not prompted the US to implement
sanctions of the variety imposed on Iraq or the other rogue states.8 Following Pakistan's
tests, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, while acknowledging the need not to
reward India and Pakistan, also emphasized that these countries should not be isolated or
made pariahs by the international community.9
The hypothesis is that due to its relatively good relationship with Pakistan, US
policymakers should attribute Pakistan's nuclear weapons program more to situational
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factors than internal characteristics. The US is able to understand and justify Pakistan's
program because it identifies with it. Although this identification is not as close as with
Israel, it is far more than with any of the rogue states. Since the program is not seen as
reflecting the true nature of Pakistan, the program is seen as less threatening and the US
is able to use more diplomatic tactics to deal with the underlying reasons for Pakistan's
program.

Content Analysis

In conducting the content analysis, the source yielded 103 documents which pertained
to Pakistan between the period January 1990 and May 1996. In Table 15 the qualitative
results indicating the frequencies of dispositional and situational co-occurrences are
shown.

Table 15. Pakistan: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences
# of co-occurrences
Dispositional (negative) 14
Situational 31

%
32.6
72.1

Note: Percentages based upon 43 references to the nuclear program of Pakistan.

Of the 43 separate references to the nuclear program of Pakistan, 31 co-occurred with
a reference to a situational factor resulting in a 72.1% co-occurrence. There were 14 co¬
occurrences with a negative dispositional reference resulting in a 32.6% co-occurrence.
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These data indicate that US policymakers attributed the nuclear program of Pakistan
more often to situational factors, than to its character. In Table 16 the breakdown of
specific situational and dispositional factors is shown.

TABLE 16. Pakistan: Situational and Dispositional References
SITUATIONAL
India
tensions with
possesses nuclear weapons
political differences
Kashmir dispute
producing ballistic missiles
Regional context of proliferation in South Asia
National Security
DIRECT CHARACTFR REFERF.NCF.
democratic
US ally
INTENTIONS
seeks ballistic missiles
threat to regional and international stability and security
BEHAVIOR
concerning behavior
unsafeguarded nuclear energy program
inflexible policies and attitudes
drains scarce national resources
damages international relations
undermines US interests

Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons is clearly attributed to its security con¬
cerns, specifically its conflict with India and that state's possession of nuclear weapons.
Pakistan's relationship with India was mentioned in 29 of the 31 situational co-occur¬
rences.
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Although much fewer, the US does associate character with Pakistan's nuclear pro¬
gram. There was a 32.6% co-occurrence of negative character references with its nuclear
program; however, these references vary significantly from those used in conjunction
with the rogue states. None of the direct character references were negative. In addition,
the behaviors and intentions mentioned refer to actions associated with Pakistan's nuclear
program and not to other unacceptable types of behavior such as terrorism and human
rights abuses. The frequencies of negative dispositional references by type in Table 17
show that the majority refer to Pakistan's behavior.

Table 17. Pakistan: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type
Type of Co-occurrence

g

%

Direct Character 0
0
Intentions 5 35.7
Behavior 9 64.3
Note: Percentages based upon 14 negative dispositional co-occurrences. Each type of
reference as a percentage of the total references to the nuclear program (43): direct
character, 0.0%; intentions, 11.6%; and, behavior, 20.9%.

These findings support the hypothesis that the US executive branch exhibits attribu¬
tion bias in its perception of Pakistan's nuclear program. Pakistan's program is driven by
its security concerns with India and not because of the character of Pakistan. It is not
indicative of Pakistan's true nature.
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Discussion

The US attributes Pakistan's nuclear ambitions to its security concerns with India.
Although the US does find that Pakistan's program is of concern and could become a
larger regional problem, it has demonstrated an understanding, if not acceptance, of the
security concerns of Pakistan and has been willing to diplomatically deal with these
concerns in order to try and cap its nuclear program. As President Clinton stated in 1995,
As Secretary of Defense Perry noted during his recent visit to South Asia, we under¬
stand that both India and Pakistan need a capable defense. Secretary Perry's visit
strengthened the framework for defense cooperation between the United States and
each country, seeking to establish a transparency that would help them make realistic
defense choices. The question is whether India and Pakistan can find reasonable
solutions to their security requirements without nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles,
while moving in parallel to deal with their underlying differences.10
The character references made in conjunction with the Pakistani program do not
diminish the perception that security concerns motivate Pakistan's program. First, the
only direct character reference made is to Pakistan's democratic character and is not
negative. The references to Pakistan's democratic system are used to explain it nuclear
program and justify flexible US policies. Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary for South
Asian Affairs, said.

'"William Clinton, "The U.S. and Pakistan Reaffirm Their Long-Standing Relation¬
ship," (joint statement with Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto, Washington DC, 11 April
1995), US Department of State Dispatch 6, no.17 (24 April 1995): 356-358, reproduced
in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of
Public Affairs, June 1996.)
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...we also realize that nuclear weapons are a political as well as a secunty issue in India
and Pakistan. Possession of these systems has strong public support. Such opinion is
important in the democratic systems of both countries. This presents us with a
different kind of challenge from what we face in such states as Iraq or North Korea.
We look to our strategy of cooperative engagement at the global, multilateral, bilateral
levels as the best way to build a public consensus in favor of non-proliferation. While
working to promote such a consensus, we continue to look for ways to encourage both
governments to brake the nuclear weapons dynamic in their countries."
Second, in 10 of the 18 dispositional references, a situational factor was also men¬
tioned.1" Thus when Pakistan is said to be inflexible, the US acknowledges that India is
also inflexible and attributes this to their dispute. Similarly, when the US says that
Pakistan's nuclear program is a threat to regional and international stability, it acknowl¬
edges that tensions with India are driving it. This makes the threat posed by Pakistan's
nuclear program seem to be unintentional.
Third, unlike the rogue states, references to its program are not linked to other issues
and problems such as Pakistan's repression of minorities, involvement in narcotics trade,
or the presence of terrorist groups within its borders. The behaviors linked to its nuclear
program reflect the consequences to Pakistan of pursuing nuclear weapons such as dam¬
aging international relations and draining national resources. These behaviors do not
give the impression that Pakistan is willing to violate international law or engage in other
irresponsible behaviors.

"Robin Raphel, "Non-proliferation Policy in South Asia," (statement before the
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Washington DC, 9 March 1995) US Department of State Dispatch 6, no. 12
(20 March 1995): 222-224, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4,
no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.)
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US policymakers did exhibit attribution bias in their statements about Pakistan's
nuclear program. Due to their friendly relationship, the US attributed Pakistan's program
to the situational factor of its dispute with India. Character references were much less
frequent and not extremely negative. Thus Pakistan is not developing nuclear weapons
because of any inherent aggressive tendencies, but in order to defend itself. Even
Pakistan's nuclear tests have not moved it into the rogue category. Although this does not
mean the US supports Pakistan's nuclear program, it does indicate an awareness of the
underlying factors which contribute to it and a willingness to adapt its policies to deal
with them.

CHAPTER 11
CONCLUSION

US nonproliferation policy has historically shown more concern over who has nuclear
weapons than with the actual weapons. This trend has continued into the post Cold War
period as the three states which have the most advanced programs, Israel, India and
Pakistan are viewed with the least concern, while Libya, a state with little nuclear infra¬
structure, is classed as a rogue. This trend has also led to the discriminatory standards
enforced among states because the US determines which states pose a nuclear threat
based upon its perception of threat, not upon material capability. States discriminate in
favor of other states with which they identify either through shared characteristics or
interests. This occurs because of the need to defend and enhance its own identity. By
perceiving states similar to itself to be good and moral, a state assures itself that it also is
good and moral. Conversely, by perceiving states with which it does not identify as evil
and immoral, a state also enhances its identity by distancing itself from characteristics
and behavior it considers unacceptable. This in-group/out-group distinction explains the
pattern of bias within US nonproliferation policy.

The US has consistently pursued

lenient policies toward in-group members and often failed to enforce existing legislation
against them, while enacting harsh and punitive policies against out-group members.
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This study has used one indicator, attribution bias, to show how the US perceives the
nuclear programs of in-group and out-groups members differently. Attribution bias
argues that the US will attributes the motivation behind a state's nuclear program differ¬
ently depending on whether that state is part of the in-group or out-group. The nuclear
programs of out-group members will be attributed to the internal characteristics of the
state thereby increasing the perception of threat. The programs of in-group members will
be attributed to external factors thereby decreasing the perception of threat.
A connection between the in-group/out-group distinction, US policy, and the presence
of attribution bias was found in all five case studies. An antagonistic relationship with
the US resulted in harsher nonproliferation policies and more dispositional co-occur¬
rences. Table 18 shows the percentages of dispositional and situational co-occurrences
for each state in order of decreasing dispositional co-occurrences.

Table 18. Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences for All States
% dispositional (negative!
Libya
Iraq
Iran
North Korea
Pakistan

% situational

85.7
0
74.8
0
67.6
0
38.6 2.1
32.6 72.1

Two patterns emerge from this table. First, the worse the relationship with the US, the
more often US policymakers attributed the state's nuclear program to its internal charac¬
teristics. Although it is arguable whether Libya or Iraq has the worst relationship with
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the US, Iran does have a better relationship than either of them and North Korea's
relationship has improved considerably since the end of the Cold War. Pakistan has the
best relationship of all the states and its program was consistently attributed to the
situational factor of its dispute with India.
Second, the frequency of dispositional co-occurrences is inversely related to the
program's level of development. Once again it can be disputed whether Libya, with its
one reactor, or Iraq, whose program has been dismantled, has the least developed
program; however, the programs of both these states are most consistently attributed to
dispositional factors. North Korea's program, the most advanced among the rogue states,
was attributed to dispositional factors only 38.6% of the time. Finally, Pakistan, which
has been able to manufacture a device since 1990, received the least dispositional
attributes. This pattern contradicts the idea that the US bases its threat perception on a
program's level of development.
The bias in the perception of US policymakers is most clearly revealed by comparing
Iraq, Iran and Libya to Pakistan. The programs of these three rogue states were consis¬
tently attributed to their characters which were perceived to be aggressive and unaccepting of international standards. In contrast, the Pakistan's program was attributed
almost entirely to its dispute with India. This difference in perception accounts for why
the US has continued to try and work with Pakistan on the issues driving its nuclear pro¬
gram even after it openly tested nuclear devices in 1998, while enacting broad sanctions
and planning military strikes against these rogue states.
The case of North Korea best illustrates the link between relationship, policy, and
perception. Although North Korea was still classed as a rogue state, its relationship with
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the US improved since the end of the Cold War. This improved relationship is reflected
in the US's mixed policy toward North Korea. The US threatened sanctions and military
action, but also used diplomacy and economic incentives to reach the Agreed Framework.
Likewise, these mixed policies reflect the ambiguities in US rhetoric. North Korea's
nuclear program was linked to its character 38.6% of the time. This was 29% less than
the dispositional co-occurrences for Iran and only 6% higher than those for Pakistan.
The North Korean case study also raises questions about the use of rhetoric by US
policymakers. This study has argued that the rhetoric of US policymakers reveals
perceptual biases regarding the nuclear programs of the rogue states and that these biases
influence the harsh policies adopted toward these states. However, policymakers also use
rhetoric for their own purposes: to influence the public and other countries and to
legitimize the policies they have adopted. The perceptions of policymakers may shape
their policies, but the rhetoric they use may be shaped by their policies. As North Korea
showed, US rhetoric changed in response to a change in policy; it did not change the
policy itself.
Further research into this subject may include a longitudinal study on how US
perceptions of individual states have changed over time and what prompted these
changes. What factors seem most salient in the perception of threat from a state's nuclear
program? Another avenue of inquiry may be to look at how closely the international
nonproliferation regime mirrors US interests. It is undeniable that the US exerts
significant pressure over the agenda of the nonproliferation regime, but is it simply an
extension of US policy or has it developed significant independence?
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Effects of US Policy on Nonproliferation

Global concern over nuclear weapons springs from the fact that they are qualitatively
different from conventional weapons. A nuclear detonation inflicts immediate and
indiscriminate damage upon an enemy against which there is no defense. Their effects
cannot be confined to a specific geography or to military targets. Although the threat of
global nuclear war between the superpowers has diminished, nuclear weapons remain a
threat. It does not take an arsenal filled with thousands of weapons, but only one to
create a nuclear threat and provide a state with a disproportional advantage. After a
certain point, numbers become meaningless in relation to nuclear weapons. These
qualitative and quantitative differences conventional weapons drive the US effort to
prevent other states from acquiring even one nuclear device.
The goal of US nonproliferation policy is to prevent states from developing nuclear
weapons and to convince states which already have to roll-back their nuclear programs.
However, the US often adopts and implements policies which undermine this goal in the
name of competing interests, economic factors, or domestic pressures. Three aspects of
US policy undermine its long-term nonproliferation goals.
First, US policy discriminates against some states and not others. By allowing some
states to develop nuclear weapons and not others the US undermines the basic premise
behind the nonproliferation regime—that all nuclear weapons should be eliminated;
however, the regime also reflects the contradictions found in US policy. The regime
legalizes nuclear weapons for some states and not others. The nuclear states cannot
create an environment of trust and transparency by maintaining a monopoly over nuclear
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technology and condemning states for developing these weapons when they retain
thousands.

These biases within US policy and the regime prejudice support for

nonproliferation.
Second, the US's original policy of technology denial to prevent proliferation has
become increasingly ineffective. While this has slowed the nuclear programs of many
states, but it has not stopped them because proliferation has become a political decision
not a technological one. As nuclear technology becomes more available, it becomes
more important for the US and the global nonproliferation effort to discover why a state
decides to pursue nuclear weapons, what factors influence their decision, and how other
states can motivate them to decide against nuclear weapons.
Third, harsh sanctions and threats have not induced any state to renounce nuclear
weapons. The states which recently abandoned their programs were subject to some
sanctions and reprisals. All of the so-called rogue states have been subject to much
harsher policies and none have given up their nuclear program voluntarily. It remains to
be seen whether North Korea will comply with the terms of the Agreed Framework.
Sanctions and threats often have the effect, as in Iraq, of hardening a state's resolve to
develop nuclear weapons by providing it with attention and increasing its level of
insecurity.
These three weaknesses in US policy are exacerbated by misperceiving the
motivations behind the nuclear programs of the rogue states. While these states most
likely do have some aggressive motivations, there are also other factors driving their
programs which US policymakers either ignore or overlook. By becoming more aware of
the other concerns influencing these states the US may be able to create incentives for
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abandoning their nuclear programs. When other factors are opportune, the US can
influence a state to accept nonproliferation standards. The examples of Kazakhstan,
Ukraine, and Belarus show how it can use its resources and negotiating powers to induce
states.
Yet US policy cannot move a state toward a nonnuclear stance by itself. A state may
be influenced by global nonproliferation norms which reflect US policy, but US policy
by itself usually plays only a marginal role in changing nuclear stances. Three states
which recently renounced nuclear weapons, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa, said the
US played little role in their decisions.1 The decisions to abandon their nuclear programs
were all driven by domestic changes. Brazil and .Argentina brought liberal regimes to
power and in South Africa the apartheid regime relinquished power. Prior to these
changes, nuclear weapons were considered vital to the security of these nations as well as
being symbols of national prestige and sources of power for the military and
bureaucracies. US policy had little effect in companson to the domestic influences.
US nonproliferation policies toward the rogue states have failed to end their nuclear
ambitions. There may be little the US is capable of doing; however, until it becomes
willing to explore methods of influencing these states aside from threats and sanctions, it
will not know what it could accomplish and the nuclear programs of these states will
continue.

'Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 32, 70.
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